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Abstract. Interpolation has been successfully applied in formal methods for model checking and test-case generation for se-
quential programs. Security protocols, however, exhibit idiosyncrasies that make them unsuitable for the direct application of
interpolation. We address this problem and present an interpolation-based method for security protocol verification. Our method
starts from a protocol specification and combines Craig interpolation, symbolic execution and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder
model to search for possible attacks on the protocol. Interpolants are generated as a response to search failure in order to prune
possible useless traces and speed up the exploration. We illustrate our method by means of concrete examples and discuss the
results obtained by using a prototype implementation.
Keywords: Security protocols, Craig interpolation, Symbolic execution, Verification
1. Introduction
A number of tools (e.g., [1–8] just to name a few) have been developed for the analysis of security
protocols at design time: starting from a formal specification of a protocol and of a security property it
should achieve, these tools typically carry out model checking or automated reasoning to either falsify
the protocol (i.e., find an attack with respect to that property) or, when possible, verify it (i.e., prove that
it does indeed guarantee that property, perhaps under some assumptions such as a bounded number of
interleaved protocol sessions [9]). While verification is, of course, the optimal result, falsification is also
extremely useful as one can often employ the discovered attack trace to directly carry out an attack on
the protocol implementation (e.g., [10]) or exploit the trace to devise a suite of test cases so as to be able
to analyze the implementation at run-time (e.g., [11–13]).
Such an endeavor has already been undertaken in the programming languages community, where,
for instance, interpolation has been successfully applied in formal methods for model checking and
test-case generation for sequential programs, e.g., [14–17], with the aim of reducing the dimensions
1Work partially supported by the FP7-ICT-2009-5 Project no. 257876, “SPaCIoS: Secure Provision and Consumption in the
Internet of Services” and the PRIN 2010-11 project “Security Horizons”. Much of this work was carried out while the authors
were at the Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Verona, Italy, and while Marco Rocchetto was at iTrust at the Singapore
University of Technology and Design. We thank Giacomo Dalle Vedove, Marco Palamà and Fabio Pettenuzzo.
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of the search space. Since a state space explosion often occurs in security protocol verification, we
expect interpolation to be useful also in this context. Security protocols, however, exhibit idiosyncrasies
that make them unsuitable for the direct application of the standard interpolation-based methods, most
notably, the fact that the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder [18] gives a security protocol a flavor of non-
determinism, makes it a non-sequential program (since the intruder, who is in complete control of the
network, can freely interleave his actions with the normal protocol execution) and requires taking care
of the deduction capabilities of the intruder.
In this paper, we address this problem and present an interpolation-based method for security protocol
verification. Our method starts from the formal specification of a protocol and of a security property
and combines Craig interpolation [19], symbolic execution [20] and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder
model [18] to search for goals (representing attacks on the protocol). Interpolation is used to prune
possible useless traces and speed up the exploration. More specifically, our method proceeds as follows:
starting from a specification of the input system, including protocol, property to be checked and a finite
number of session instances (possibly generated automatically by using a preprocessor), it first creates
a corresponding sequential non-deterministic program, according to a procedure that we have devised,
and then defines a set of goals and searches for them by symbolically executing the program. When a
goal is reached, an attack trace can be extracted from the constraints that the execution of the path has
produced; such constraints represent conditions over parameters that allow one to reconstruct the attack
trace found. When the search fails to reach a goal, a backtrack phase starts, during which the nodes
of the graph are annotated (according to an adaptation of the algorithm defined in [15] for sequential
programs) with formulas obtained by using Craig interpolation. Such formulas express conditions over
the program variables, which, when implied from the program state of a given execution, ensure that no
goal will be reached by going forward and thus that we can discard the current branch. The output of the
method is a proof of (bounded) correctness in the case when no goal location can be reached; otherwise
all the discovered (one or more) attack traces are produced.
In order to show that our method concretely speeds up the validation, we have implemented a Java pro-
totype called SPiM (Security Protocol interpolation Method). We report here also on some experiments
that we have performed: we considered seven case studies and compared the analysis of SPiM with and
without interpolation, thereby showing that interpolation does indeed speed up security protocol verifica-
tion by reducing the search space and the execution time. We also compare the SPiM tool with the three
state-of-the-art model checkers for security protocols that are part of the AVANTSSAR platform [1],
namely, CL-AtSe [21], OFMC [3] and SATMC [22]. This comparison shows, as we expected, that SPiM
is not yet as efficient as these mature tools but that there is considerable room for improvement, e.g., by
enhancing our interpolation-based method with some of the optimization techniques that are integrated
in the other tools.
Summarizing, we list the contributions of this work as follows.
(1) We define a translation of security protocols into sequential programs and we prove the correctness
of this translation.
(2) By adapting existing program analysis techniques, we propose a new approach for security proto-
col verification that combines Craig interpolation, symbolic execution and the standard Dolev-Yao
intruder.
(3) We implement our technique in a tool called SPiM and we show that Craig interpolation produces
a speed-up in the verification process up to 70%.
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We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide some (fairly standard) background on security pro-
tocol verification, discussing the algebra of protocol messages, the Dolev-Yao intruder, the two security
protocol specification languages ASLan++ and ASLan that we consider in our method (which is how-
ever open to the integration with other protocol specification languages), and the running example (the
NSL protocol) that we will consider in the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we introduce SiL, the input
language of our SPiM tool, which is a simple imperative programming language that we use to define the
sequential programs to be analyzed by the verification algorithm. We also give the details of the trans-
lation procedure from security protocols into sequential programs, for one and more protocol sessions,
and prove the correctness of the translation (i.e., that it does not introduce nor delete attacks with respect
to the input ASLan++ specification). In Section 4, we present our interpolation algorithm, which is a
slightly simplified version of McMillan’s IntraLA algorithm [15], and show it at work for our running
example. In Section 5, we introduce the SPiM tool, discuss the experiments that we have performed
and describe the interpolants generated by the tool during the analysis. In Section 6, we discuss further
related work (in addition to the works already considered in the rest of the paper), and we conclude in
Section 7 by summarizing our main results and discussing future work. Additional details (examples and
a proof of one of the lemmas) are given in appendix. This paper extends and supersedes [23].
2. Background
We provide some (fairly standard) background on security protocol verification and briefly describe
the two specification languages ASLan++ and ASLan.
2.1. Messages
Security protocols describe how agents exchange messages, built using cryptographic primitives, in
order to obtain security guarantees such as confidentiality or authentication. Protocol specifications are
parametric and prescribe a general recipe for communication that can be used by different agents playing
in the protocol roles (sender, receiver, server, etc.). The algebra of messages tells us how messages
are constructed. Following standard practice (e.g., [3, 24]), we consider a countable signature Σ and
a countable set Var of variable symbols disjoint from Σ, and write Σn for the symbols of Σ with arity
n; thus Σ0 is the set of constants, which we assume to have disjoint subsets that we refer to as agent
names (or just agents), public keys, private keys, symmetric keys and nonces. The variables are, however,
untyped (unless denoted otherwise) and can be instantiated with arbitrary types, yielding an untyped
model. We will use upper-case letters to denote variables (e.g., A,B, . . . for agents, N for nonces, etc.)
and lower-case letters to denote the corresponding constants (concrete agents names, concrete nonces,
etc.). All these may be possibly annotated with subscripts and superscripts.
The symbols of Σ that have arity greater than zero are partitioned into the set Σp of (public) opera-
tions and the set Σm of mappings. The public operations represent all those operations that every agent
(including the intruder) can perform on messages they know. In this paper, we consider the following
public operations:2
• {M1}M2 represents the asymmetric encryption of M1 with public key M2;
2We could, of course, quite straightforwardly add other operations, e.g., for hash functions, but refrain from doing so for the
sake of simplicity.
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• {M1}inv(M2) represents the asymmetric encryption of M1 with private key inv(M2) (the mapping
inv(·) is discussed below);
• {|M1|}M2 represents the symmetric encryption of M1 with symmetric key M2;
• [M1,M2] (or simply M1,M2 when there is no risk of confusion) represents the concatenation of M1
and M2.
In contrast to the public operations, the mappings of Σm are those functions that do not correspond to
operations that agents can perform on messages, but that map between constants. In this paper, we use
the following two mappings. First, inv(M) gives the private key that corresponds to the public key M.
Second, for long-term key infrastructures, we assume that every agent A has a public key pk(A) and a
corresponding private key inv(pk(A)); thus pk(. . .) is a mapping from agents to public keys. In the same
way, one may model further long-term key infrastructures, e.g., using sk(A,B) to denote a shared key of
agents A and B.
Since the mappings map from constants to constants, we consider a term like inv(pk(a)) as atomic
as its construction does not involve any operation performed by an honest agent or the intruder, nor is
there a way to “decompose” such a message into smaller parts. Since we will also deal with terms that
contain variables, let us call atomic all terms that are built from constants in Σ0, variables in Var, and the
mappings of Σm. The set TΣ(Var) of all terms is the closure of the atomic terms under the operations of
Σp. A ground term is a term without variables, and we denote the set of ground terms with TΣ.
As is often done in security protocol verification, we interpret terms in the free algebra, i.e., every term
is interpreted by itself and thus two terms are equal iff they are syntactically equal (e.g., two constant
symbols n1 and n2 immediately represent different values). Numerous algebras have been considered in
security protocol verification, e.g. [25, 26], ranging from the free algebra to various formalizations of
algebraic properties of the cryptographic operators employed. Here, for simplicity, we consider only the
free algebra in order to be able to focus on the introduction of our interpolation method. Moreover, our
results require a bound on the message depth (that we introduce later, in Section 4.3), but, fortunately,
such a bound is known for the free algebra when considering a finite number of sessions (see, e.g., [9]).
We believe that, in principle, our interpolation method could be applied to more complex algebras (e.g.,
for protocols that make use of modular exponentiation or xor) as long as such a bound can be established
for the considered equational theory. We leave this investigation for future work.
2.2. The Dolev-Yao Intruder
For concreteness and brevity, we consider here the standard Dolev and Yao [18] model of an active
intruder, denoted by i, who controls the network but cannot break cryptography; note, however, that our
approach is independent of the actual strength of the intruder and weaker (or stronger, e.g., being able to
attack the cryptography) intruder models could be considered.
The intruder i can intercept messages and analyze them if he possesses the corresponding keys for
decryption, and he can generate messages from his knowledge and send them under any agent name.
For a set IK of messages, we define DY (IK) (for “Dolev-Yao” and “Intruder Knowledge”) to be the
smallest set closed under the standard generation (G) and analysis (A) rules of the system NDY given in
Fig. 1. The G rules express that the intruder can compose messages from known messages using pairing,
asymmetric and symmetric encryption. The A rules describe how the intruder can decompose messages.
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M ∈ IK
M ∈ DY (IK) Gaxiom
M1 ∈ DY (IK) M2 ∈ DY (IK)
[M1,M2] ∈ DY (IK)
Gpair
M1 ∈ DY (IK) M2 ∈ DY (IK)
{M1}M2 ∈ DY (IK)
Gcrypt
M1 ∈ DY (IK) M2 ∈ DY (IK)
{|M1|}M2 ∈ DY (IK)
Gscrypt
[M1,M2] ∈ DY (IK)
Mi ∈ DY (IK)
Apairi
{|M1|}M2 ∈ DY (IK) M2 ∈ DY (IK)
M1 ∈ DY (IK)
Ascrypt
{M1}M2 ∈ DY (IK) inv(M2) ∈ DY (IK)
M1 ∈ DY (IK)
Acrypt
{M1}inv(M2) ∈ DY (IK) M2 ∈ DY (IK)
M1 ∈ DY (IK)
A−1crypt
Fig. 1. The systemNDY of rules of the Dolev-Yao intruder.
2.3. ASLan++ and ASLan
We give here a brief overview of the security protocol specification languages ASLan++ [27] and
ASLan [28], focusing on the aspects relevant to our method. We remark that our methodology can be
easily adapted to work with other protocol specification languages (which, like ASLan++, typically
specify the different protocol roles as interacting processes) by providing a translator to the SiL input
language as described in Section 3.2.
ASLan++ is a formal and typed security protocol specification language, whose semantics is defined
in terms of the more low-level language ASLan, which we describe below.
Hierarchy of entities. An ASLan++ specification consists of a hierarchy of entity declarations, which
are similar to Java classes. The top-level entity is usually called Environment (similar to the “main”
procedure of a program) and it typically contains the definition of a Session entity, which in turn contains
a number of sub-entities representing all the parties involved in a protocol. Each entity of an ASLan++
specification is composed of two main sections: symbols, in which there is the instantiation of all the
variables and constants used in the entity, and body, in which the behavior of the entity is described (e.g.,
message exchange).
The body of an entity. Inside the body of an entity we use three different types of statements: assign-
ment, message send and message receive. An assignment has the form Var := constant, which as-
signs to the variable Var a constant of the proper type (a new constant is generated if Var := fresh()
is used). A message send statement, Sender -> Receiver: M, is composed of two variables Sender
and Receiver representing sender and receiver, respectively, and a message M exchanged between the
two parties. In message receive, Sender and Receiver are swapped and usually, in order to assign a
value to the variable M, a ? precedes the message M, i.e., Sender -> Receiver: ?M. In ASLan++, the
Actor keyword refers to the entity itself (similar to “this” or “self” in object-oriented languages) and
thus we actually write the send and receive statements as Actor -> Receiver: M and Sender ->
Actor: ?M, respectively.
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A→ i : {NA,A}pk(i) Alice1.Actor→ Alice1.B : {Alice1.Na,Alice1.Actor}pk(Alice1.B) a→ i : {c1,a}pk(i)
i(A)→ B : {NA,A}pk(B) ?→ Bob2.Actor : {Bob2.Na,Bob2.A}pk(Bob2.Actor) i(a)→ b : {c1,a}pk(b)
B→ i(A) : {NA,NB}pk(A) Bob2.Actor→ Bob2.A : {Bob2.Na,Bob2.Nb}pk(Bob2.A) b→ i(a) : {c1,c2}pk(a)
i→ A : {NA,NB}pk(A) Alice1.B→ Alice1.Actor : {Alice1.Na,Alice1.Nb}pk(Alice1.Actor) i→ a : {c1,c2}pk(a)
A→ i : {NB}pk(i) Alice1.Actor→ Alice1.B : {Alice1.Nb}pk(Alice1.B) a→ i : {c2}pk(i)
i(A)→ B : {NB}pk(B) Bob2.A→ Bob2.Actor : {Bob2.Nb}pk(Bob2.Actor) i(a)→ b : {c2}pk(b)
Fig. 2. Man-in-the-middle attack on the NSPK protocol (left), symbolic attack trace at state 15 of the algorithm execution
(middle) and instantiated attack trace obtained with our method (right).
1 entity Alice(Actor, B: agent) {
2 symbols
3 Na, Nb: text;
4 body{
5 Na := fresh();
6 Actor -> B: {Na,Actor}_pk(B);
7 B -> Actor: {Na,?Nb,B}_pk(Actor);
8 Actor -> B: {auth:(Nb)}_pk(B);
9 }
10 }
1 entity Bob(A, Actor: agent) {
2 symbols
3 Na, Nb: text;
4 body{
5 ? -> Actor: {?Na,?A}_pk(Actor);
6 Nb := fresh();
7 Actor -> A: {Na,Nb,Actor}_pk(A);
8 A -> Actor: {auth:(Nb)}_pk(Actor);
9 }
10 }
Fig. 3. Partial ASLan++ specification for the protocol NSL.
Example 1. As a running example, we will use NSL, the Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) pro-
tocol with Lowe’s fix [7], which aims at mutual authentication between A and B:
A→ B : {NA,A}pk(B)
B→ A : {NA,NB,B}pk(A)
A→ B : {NB}pk(B)
The presence of B in the second message prevents the man-in-the-middle attack that NSPK suffers from,
which is shown on the left of Fig. 2, where we write i(A) to denote that the intruder is impersonating the
honest agent A (that is, i(x) denotes the intruder playing the role of x, for x an agent name.)
We give the complete ASLan++ specification for the protocol NSL in Appendix A. In Figure 3, we
briefly describe only the section modeling the behavior of the two entities involved. Note that, for read-
ability, from now on, we use math fonts instead of mixing math and typewriter fonts (e.g., we write
iknows(Payload) instead of iknows(Payload)) in the text, while we use typewriter in code listings.
The two roles are Alice, who is the initiator of the protocol, and Bob, the responder. The elements
between parentheses in line 1 declare which variables are used to denote the agents playing the different
roles. Along the specification of the role Alice: Actor refers to the agent playing the role of Alice itself,
while B is the variable referring to the agent who Alice believes is playing the role of Bob. Similarly, the
section symbols declares that Na and Nb are variables of type text, which is the type used in ASLan++
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for arbitrary messages. The section body specifies the behavior of the role. First, the operation fresh()
assigns to the nonce Na a value that is different from the value assigned to any other nonce. Then Alice
sends the nonce, together with her name, to the agent B, encrypted with B’s public key. In line 7, Alice
receives her nonce back together with a further variable (expected to represent B’s nonce in a regular
session of the protocol) and the name of B, all encrypted with her own public key. As a last step, Alice
sends to B the nonce Nb encrypted with B’s public key.
The variable declarations and the behavior of Bob are specified by the listing on the right. We omit a
full description of the code and only remark that the “?” in the beginning of line 5 denotes the fact that
the sender of such a message can be any agent, though no assignment is made for ? in that case. 
Description of goals. Finally, we describe here two kinds of protocol goals in ASLan++. A channel
goal, label(_): Sender <chn> Receiver;, defines a property <chn> that holds on all (the “_” is a
wildcard) the exchanged messages labeled with label between the two entities Sender and Receiver.
Labels are used to specify the class of messages for which a given property is required to be satisfied. For
example, we use authentication goals defined as auth_goal(_): Sender *-> Receiver;, where
*-> specifies the fact that the receiver authenticates the sender. A secrecy goal is defined with label(
_): {Sender, Receiver}, which states that each message labeled with label can only be shared
between the two entities Sender and Receiver.
Example 2. In the NSL running example, we want to verify whether the man-in-the-middle attack known
for the NSPK protocol can be still applied after Lowe’s fix. The scenario we are interested in can be
obtained by the following ASLan++ instantiation:
1 body { % of Environment
2 any Session(a,i);
3 any Session(a,b);
4 }
In session 1, the roles of Alice and Bob are played by the agents a and i, respectively, whereas in
session 2 they are played by a and b.
A set of goals needs also to be specified. For simplicity, here we only require to check the authentication
property with respect to the nonce of Bob, i.e., we will verify that the responder Bob authenticates the
initiator Alice.
1 goals { auth:(_) A *-> B; }

Translation from ASLan++ into ASLan. As discussed in [1], an ASLan++ specification can be auto-
matically translated into a more low-level ASLan specification, which ultimately defines a transition
system M = 〈S,I,→〉, where S is the set of states, I ⊆ S is the set of initial states, and → ⊆ S×S is
the (reflexive) transition relation. A state is defined as a set of ground facts, i.e., the set of predicates
holding in that state, all other ground facts being false (closed-world assumption). The structure of an
ASLan specification is composed of six different sections: signature of the predicates, types of variables
and constants, initial state, Horn clauses, transition rules of → and protocol goals. The content of the
sections is intuitively described by their names. In particular, an initial state I ∈ I is composed of the
concatenation of all the predicates that hold before applying any rewrite rule (e.g., the agent names and
the intruder’s own keys).
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The specifications that we consider in this paper do not use Horn clauses, but rather a so called Prelude
file, in which all the actions of the DY intruder are defined as a set H of Horn clauses, is automatically
imported during the translation from ASLan++ into ASLan (see [28]).
The transition relation→ is defined as follows. For all S ∈ S, S→ S′ iff there exist
• a rule such that
PP.NP&PC&NC =[V ]⇒ R ,
where PP and NP are sets of positive and negative predicates, PC and NC conjunctions of positive
and negative atomic conditions, and
• a substitution σ : {v1, . . . ,vn}→ TΣ, where v1, . . . ,vn are the variables that occur in PP and PC such
that:
(1) PPσ ⊆ dSeH , where dSeH is the closure of S with respect to the set of clauses H,
(2) PCσ holds,
(3) NPσσ ′∩dSeH = /0 for all substitutions σ ′ such that NPσσ ′ is ground,
(4) NCσσ ′ holds for all substitutions σ ′ such that NCσσ ′ is ground and
(5) S′ = (S \PPσ)∪Rσσ ′′, where σ ′′ is any substitution such that for all v ∈ V , vσ ′′ does not
occur in S.
We now define the translation of the relevant ASLan++ constructs to ASLan. Every ASLan++ entity
is translated into a new state predicate and added to the section signature. This predicate is parametrized
with respect to a step label (that uniquely identifies every instance) and it mainly keeps track of the local
state of an instance (current values of whose variables) and expresses the control flow of the entity by
means of step labels. As an example, if we have the ASLan++ entity
1 entity Sender(Actor, Receiver: agent){
2 symbols
3 Var: message;
4 }
the predicate state_Sender is added to the section signature and, assuming an instantiation of the
entity new Sender(sender, receiver), the new predicate
1 state_Sender(sender, iid, sl_0, receiver, dummy_message)
is used in transition rules to store all the informations of an entity, where the ID iid identifies a
particular instance, sl_0 is the step label, the parameters Actor, Receiver are replaced with con-
stants sender and receiver, respectively, and the message variable Var is initially instantiated with
dummy_message.
Given that an ASLan++ specification is a hierarchy of entities, when an entity is translated into ASLan,
this hierarchy is preserved by a child(id_1, id_0) predicate that states that id_0 is the parent entity
of id_1 and both id_0 and id_1 are entity IDs.
A variable assignment statement is translated into a transition rule inside the rules section. As an
example, if in the body of the entity Sender defined above there is an assignment Var := constant
;, where constant is of the same type of Var, then we obtain the following transition rule:
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1 state_Sender(Actor,IID,sl,Receiver,Var)
2 =>
3 state_Sender(Actor,IID,succ(sl),Receiver,constant)
which, for a given entity specified by IID, produces a predicate where the step label is increased and the
variable is replaced by a constant. In the case of assignments to fresh(), the variable Var is assigned
to a new variable.
In the case of a message exchange (sending or receiving statements) the iknows(message) predicate
is added to the left-hand side of the corresponding ASLan rule. This states that the message message
has been sent over the network, where iknows stands for intruder knows and is used because, as is
usual, the Dolev-Yao intruder is identified with the network itself.
The last point we discuss is the translation of goals focusing on authentication and secrecy described
above. The label in a send statement (e.g., Actor -> Receiver: auth:(Na)) generates a new
predicate witness(Actor,Receiver,label,Payload) that is inserted into the ASLan transition
rule representing the send statement. An equivalent request(Actor,Sender,label,Payload,IID
) predicate is added for receive statements. These predicates are used in the translation of goals. In fact,
an authentication goal is translated into the state (i.e., attack state)
1 not(dishonest(Sender)).
2 not(witness(Sender, Receiver, auth, Payload)).
3 request(Receiver, Sender, auth, Payload, IID)
where not(dishonest(Sender)) states the sender Sender must not be the intruder, not(witness
(Sender, Receiver, auth, Payload)) states the payload of the authentication message must not
be sent by the honest agent Sender and the last request predicate states the receiver Receiver has
received the authentication message. A secrecy goal is translated into the attack state
1 iknows(Payload).
2 not(contains(i, Knowers)).
3 secret(Payload, label, Knowers)
where iknows(Payload) means that the intruder knows the payload, that the set of knowers (Sender
and Receiver in the example above) does not contain the intruder i and the secret predicate is used
to check the goal only when the rule containing the secrecy goal label is fired. This is because a secret
(Payload, label, Knowers) predicate is added to all the transition rules that are translations of
statements in which the payload of the secrecy goal is used. The declaration of an attack state AS amounts
to adding a rule AS => AS.attack for a nullary predicate attack.
Example 3. With regard to the NSL example, we show the ASLan specification corresponding to the
translation of line 7 of the entity Alice (Figure 3):
1 iknows(crypt(pk(E_S_A_Actor), pair(Na, pair(Nb_1, E_S_A_B)))).
2 state_Alice(E_S_A_Actor, E_S_A_IID, 3, E_S_A_B, Na, Nb)
3 =>
4 state_Alice(E_S_A_Actor, E_S_A_IID, 4, E_S_A_B, Na, Nb_1)
The original ASLan++ statement is a receive action. Its translation corresponds to (i) adding a new
iknows predicate, concerning the message received and (ii) updating the state fact of Alice: in particular,
in the transition rule, the step label is incremented (from 3 to 4) and the argument referring to the
variable Nb, which is the only one preceded by ? in the ASLan++ specification, gets the value of the
nonce contained in the message. 
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3. Translating security protocols into sequential programs
3.1. The SPiM Input Language SiL
In Fig. 4, we present the full grammar of the SPiM Input Language SiL, a simple imperative pro-
gramming language that we will use to define the sequential programs to be analyzed by the verification
algorithm.
Definition 1. The SPiM Input Language SiL is defined by the grammar in Fig. 4, where X ranges over a
set of variable locations Loc and c ranges over the set Σ0∪N. 
The basic terms of the language, constants and variable locations, are in the syntactic category E.
A message M is a constant, a variable location, a concatenated message or some form of encrypted
message.
The category L denotes lists of messages, whereas S stands for a set of messages: here IK is a special
identifier referring to the intruder knowledge and + is used to denote the union operation between sets.
B denotes the class of Booleans. In addition to the standard Boolean constants and operators, SiL
contains two specific predicates: IK `M, which intuitively evaluates to true when the message M is
derivable from the set of messages in IK, and witness, with three arguments (a sender, a receiver, and a
message), which is used in order to verify an authentication goal.
Finally, the statements of SiL, in the category C, comprise standard constructs (like assignments,
conditionals and concatenation) together with mechanisms used to handle specific aspects of security
protocols, like the possibility of setting the values of the message set variable IK, the ternary predicate
witness and the boolean variable attack. The latter is set to true when an attack is found.3
Definition 2. We denote with V = Loc∪{IK,attack,witness} the set of program variables and with D=
Σ0∪N∪P (TΣ)∪{true, false}∪P
(
Σ0×Σ0×TΣ
)
the set of possible data values, i.e., natural numbers,
ground messages, sets of ground messages, Boolean values and sets of triples (agent, agent, message)
for the witness predicate. 
Note that here, in order to simplify the presentation, we do not use an explicitly typed model. However,
the implementation described in Section 5 does make use of a typed model in order to improve the
efficiency of the tool (at the relatively small expense of not being able to find type-flaw attacks, which are
anyway often “corrected” when moving from a protocol’s specification to its concrete implementation
in a typed programming language).
Definition 3. A (SiL concrete) data state (that we will sometimes refer to only as “state”) is a function
ς : V → D and we denote with D the set of all such functions. 
In order to specify the behavior of SiL constructs, we present a big-step structural operational seman-
tics for it. As it is the case for any structural operational semantics, the definition is given by means of
a proof system. Rules manipulate judgments of the form < T,ς >⇓ v, where T denotes an element in
3Two remarks are in order. First, for simplicity, we give the syntax in the case of a single goal to be considered; in case of
more goals, a distinct attack variable can be added for each goal. Second, by the definition of the translation procedure into
a SiL program, an authentication goal is verified immediately after the receipt of the message on which the authentication is
based. Thus, we do not need in SiL an equivalent of the ASLan predicate request.
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E ::= X | c
M ::= E | [M,M] | {M}M | {M}inv(M) | {|M|}M
L ::= M | L,M
S ::= {L} | IK | S+S
B ::= true | false | IK `M | E = E | witness(E,E,M) | not(B) | B or B | B and B
C ::= X := E | IK := S | attack := B | witness(E,E,M) := true |C;C | if B then C else C | skip | end
Fig. 4. The grammar of SiL.
any of the syntactic categories of SiL and v is a data value of the corresponding type (in particular, v is
a state in the case when T is a statement). In a big-step semantics [29] formulation, < T,ς >⇓ v means
that by the complete evaluation of T in the state ς , we obtain v. (This is in opposition to what happens
in the case of the so-called small-step semantics, where each sequent denotes a minimal, atomic step of
evaluation.) For instance, <C,ς >⇓ ς ′ denotes that by evaluating the statement C in a state ς , we move
to a state ς ′. Given the simplicity of the language and the kind of analysis that we intend to carry out on
it, we chose to give a big-step semantics, which typically has the advantage of needing fewer inference
rules and allowing for a more concise presentation.
Definition 4. The big-step operational semantics of SiL is defined by the proof system in Fig. 5, where
we use the following meta-variables: m ranges over TΣ, l ranges over lists of elements of TΣ, p ranges
over P (TΣ), and b ∈ {true, false}. We denote with ς [m/X ] the state obtained from ς by replacing the
content of X by m, i.e., ς [m/X ](Y ) = m if Y = X and ς [m/X ](Y ) = ς(Y ) otherwise. 
The rules for the evaluation of basic terms are quite simple: a constant evaluates to itself and a variable
to the value associated to it in a given data state. The rules for compound messages evaluate the single
components and then merge the results in a message of the appropriate form. The rules of the third class
show how lists are evaluated by concatenating single messages and how sets of messages are built by
using lists. In particular, the special set variable IK is evaluated in the same way as any other variable.
Evaluation of Booleans is standard: constants evaluate to themselves; predicates (equality and witness)
evaluate either to true or false, according to a side condition referring to the values of the arguments;
compound Boolean expressions are evaluated by functionally composing the truth values of the compo-
nents.
Finally, the rules for statements modify the data state on which they are applied. Assignments modify
the state value of the variable considered (be it a generic variable, IK or a variable referring to a pred-
icate). Concatenation and conditional statements are treated as usual. skip and end do not alter the data
state: the first one is just introduced in order to simplify the proof of some results, while the latter allows
one to ignore the statements that follow.
3.2. The translation procedure
Definition 5. Given a protocol P involving a set R of roles (Alice,Bob, . . ., a.k.a. entities), a session
instance (or session, for short) of P is a function si assigning an agent (honest agent or the intruder i) to
each element ofR. A scenario of a protocol P is a finite number of session instances of P . 
The input of our method is then:
(1) an ASLan++ specification of a protocol P ,
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BASIC TERMS
< X ,ς >⇓ ς(X) < c,ς >⇓ c
MESSAGES
< M1,ς >⇓ m1 < M2,ς >⇓ m2
< [M1,M2],ς >⇓ [m1,m2]
< M1,ς >⇓ m1 < M2,ς >⇓ m2
< {M1}M2 ,ς >⇓ {m1}m2
< M1,ς >⇓ m1 < M2,ς >⇓ m2
< {M1}inv(M2),ς >⇓ {m1}inv(m2)
< M1,ς >⇓ m1 < M2,ς >⇓ m2
< {|M1|}M2 ,ς >⇓ {|m1|}m2
LISTS AND SETS OF MESSAGES
< L,ς >⇓ l < M,ς >⇓ m
< L,M,ς >⇓ l,m
< L,ς >⇓ l
< {L},ς >⇓ {l} < IK,ς >⇓ ς(IK)
< S1,ς >⇓ p1 < S2,ς >⇓ p2
< S1 +S2,ς >⇓ p1 ∪ p2
BOOLEAN EXPRESSIONS
< IK,ς >⇓ ς(IK) < M,ς >⇓ m
< IK `M,ς >⇓ true m ∈ DY (ς(IK))
< IK,ς >⇓ ς(IK) < M,ς >⇓ m
< IK `M,ς >⇓ false m /∈ DY (ς(IK))
< E1,ς >⇓ c1 < E2,ς >⇓ c2
< E1 = E2,ς >⇓ true
c1 = c2
< E1,ς >⇓ c1 < E2,ς >⇓ c2
< E1 = E2,ς >⇓ false c1 6= c2
< true,ς >⇓ true < E1,ς >⇓ c1 < E2,ς >⇓ c2 < M,ς >⇓ m
< witness(E1,E2,M),ς >⇓ true
(c1,c2,m) ∈ ς(witness)
< false,ς >⇓ false < E1,ς >⇓ c1 < E2,ς >⇓ c2 < M,ς >⇓ m
< witness(E1,E2,M),ς >⇓ f alse
(c1,c2,m) /∈ ς(witness)
< B,ς >⇓ b
< not(B),ς >⇓ ¬b
< B1,ς >⇓ b1 < B2,ς >⇓ b2
< B1 or B2,ς >⇓ b1 ∨b2
< B1,ς >⇓ b1 < B2,ς >⇓ b2
< B1 and B2,ς >⇓ b1 ∧b2
STATEMENTS
< E,ς >⇓ c
< X := E,ς >⇓ ς [c/X ]
< S,ς >⇓ p
< IK := S,ς >⇓ ς [p/IK]
< B,ς >⇓ b
< attack := B,ς >⇓ ς [b/attack]
< E1,ς >⇓ c1 < E2,ς >⇓ c2 < M,ς >⇓ m
< witness(E1,E2,M) := true,ς >⇓ ς [witness∪{(c1,c2,m)}/witness]
<C0,ς >⇓ ς ′′ <C1,ς ′′ >⇓ ς ′
<C0;C1,ς >⇓ ς ′
< B,ς >⇓ true <C0,ς >⇓ ς ′
< i f B then C0 else C1,ς >⇓ ς ′
< B,ς >⇓ false <C1,ς >⇓ ς ′
< i f B then C0 else C1,ς >⇓ ς ′
< skip,ς >⇓ ς < end,ς >⇓ ς < end;C1,ς >⇓ ς
Fig. 5. A big-step semantics for SiL.
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(2) a scenario S of P , and
(3) a set of goals (i.e., properties to be verified) in S.
We will first describe how to obtain a program for a single session and then how to decorate it with goal
locations used to verify security properties. In Section 3.3, finally, we will explain how to combine more
sessions in a single program.
3.2.1. Translating a single session
First of all, we notice that in our translation, and according to the ASLan++/ASLan instantiation
mechanism, a session instance between two honest agents is represented as the composition of two
sessions, where each of the honest agents communicates with the intruder. We will refer to the session
instances obtained after such a translation as program instances.
Example 4. For example, the second session of our running example (Example 1), i.e., the one between
a and b, is obtained by the composition of two program instances, the first played by a and i(b) and the
second by i(a) and b, thus giving rise to the following three program instances
Program Alice Bob
1 a i
2 a i(b)
3 i(a) b

To simplify notation, for the variables and constants of the resulting program we will use the same
names as the ones used in the ASLan++ specification. However, in order to distinguish between variables
with the same name occurring in the specification of different roles, program variables have the form
E.V , where E denotes the role and V the variable name in the specification. In the case when more than
one session are considered, we also prefix an index denoting the session to the program variable name,
e.g., as in S1_E.V .
The behavior of the intruder introduces a form of non-determinism even within a single session,
e.g., related to the construction of a message sent by the intruder, which we capture by letting the
program depend on a number of input values, one for each intruder choice. The corresponding input
variables are denoted by the symbol Y , possibly subscripted with an index. Finally, symbols of the form
c_i, for i an integer, are used to denote constants to be assigned to nonces.
Structure of the program. The exchange of messages in a session follows a given flow of execution
that can be used to determine an order between the instructions contained in the different roles. Such a
sequence of instructions will constitute the skeleton of the program.
After a first section that concerns the initialization of the variables, the program will indeed contain
a proper translation, based on the semantics of ASLan++, of the instructions in such a sequence. For
each program instance, we will follow the flow of execution of the honest agents, as we can think of the
intruder actions as not being driven by any protocol, and model the intruder interaction with the honest
agents by means of IK `M statements and updates of IK.
In the next paragraphs, we will describe more specifically: (i) how variables are initialized and (ii)
how each statement is translated.
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Initialization of the variables. A first section of the program consists of the initialization of the vari-
ables. Let pi be the program instance of the program we are considering. For each role Alice such that
pi(Alice) = a, for some agent name a 6= i, we have an initialization instruction Alice.Actor := a. Fur-
thermore, for the same Alice, and for each other role Bob, with B being the variable referring to the role
Bob amongst the agent variables of Alice: if si(Bob) = b, then we have the assignment Alice.B := b.
Finally, it is necessary to initialize the intruder knowledge. A typical initialization instruction for IK has
the form:
IK := {a_1, ...,a_n, i,pk(a_1), ...,pk(a_n),pk(i), inv(pk(i))} .
That is, i knows each agent a_j involved in the scenario and his public keys pk(a_j), as well as his own
public and private keys pk(i) and inv(pk(i)). Specific protocols might require a specific initial intruder
knowledge or the initialization of further variables, depending on the context, such as symmetric keys or
hash functions, which are possibly defined in the Prelude section of the ASLan++ specification.
Sending of a message. The sending of a message Actor→ B : M defined in a role Alice is translated
into the instruction IK := IK+{M}, where the symbol + denotes set union (corresponding to ∪) so that
the the message M is added to the intruder knowledge.
Receipt of a message. Consider the receipt of a message R→ Actor : M in a role Alice. Assume the
message is sent from a role Bob. Then the instruction is translated into the following code
1 If (IK |- M)
2 then Alice.Q_1 := Y_1;
3 ...
4 Alice.Q_n := Y_n;
5 else end;
where Q_1, ...,Q_n are all the variables preceded by ? occurring in M and Y_1, ...,Y_n are distinct input
variables not introduced elsewhere.
Generation of fresh values. Finally, an instruction of the form N := fresh() in Alice, which assigns a
fresh value to a nonce, can be translated into the instruction Alice.N := c_1, where c_1 is a constant not
introduced elsewhere.
3.2.2. Defining goals for the verification of security properties
Introducing goal locations. The next step consists of decorating the program with a goal location
for each security property to be verified. As it is common when performing symbolic execution [20], we
express such properties as correctness assertions, typically placed at the end of a program. Once we have
represented a protocol session as a program (or more programs in the case when a session instance is split
into more program instances), and defined the properties we are interested in as correctness assertions in
such a program, the problem of verifying security properties over (a session of) the protocol is reduced
to verifying the correctness of the program with respect to those assertions.
We consider here two common security properties (authentication and confidentiality) and show how
to represent them in the program in terms of assertions. They are expressed by means of a statement of
the form if (not(expr)) then attack := true, where expr is an expression referring to the goal considered,
as described below.
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Authentication. Assume that we want to verify that Alice authenticates Bob with respect to a mes-
sage M in the specification of the protocol, in a given program instance by the ASLan++ statement:
B→ Actor : auth : (M), where auth is the label of the goal and a corresponding sending statement is
included in the specification.
We can restrict our attention to the case when according to the program instance under consideration
Bob is played by i, since otherwise the authentication property is trivially satisfied. The problem thus
reduces to verifying whether the agent i is playing under his real name (in which case authentication is
again trivially satisfied) or whether i is pretending to be someone else, i.e., whether the agent playing
Alice believes she is speaking to someone who is not i. Hence, one of the conditions required in order to
reach the goal is not(Alice.B = i), where B is the agent variable referring to the role Bob inside Alice.
A second condition is necessary and concerns the fact that the message M has not been sent by Alice.B
to Alice.Actor. This can be verified by using the witness predicate, which is set to true when the message
is sent and whose state is checked when a goal is searched for, i.e., immediately after the receipt of the
message M.
Example 5. In NSL, we are interested in verifying a property of authentication in the session that
assigns i to Alice and b to Bob: namely, we want Bob to authenticate Alice with respect to the nonce
Bob.Nb contained in the reception in line 8 on the right of the NSL example (Example 1). Such a receipt
corresponds to the sending of line 8 on the left. Thus we can add a witness assignment of the form
|witness(Alice.Actor, Alice.B, [Alice.Nb,pk(Alice.B)]) := true| after the sending, and the instruction
1 if (not(Bob.A = i) and not(witness(Bob.A, Bob.Actor, {Bob.Nb}_pk(Bob.Actor))))
2 then attack:=true;
3 else skip;
after the receipt of the message. 
Confidentiality. Assume that we want to verify that the message corresponding to a variable M, in
the specification of a role Alice of the protocol, is confidential between a given set of roles R =
{Alice_1, . . . ,Alice_n} in a session si, i.e., we have a sending statement Actor → B : {secret : (M)},
where secret is the goal label, for a confidentiality goal expressed as secret : (_) {Alice_1, . . . ,Alice_n}.
This amounts to checking whether the agent i got to know the confidential message M even though i is
not included in R. Inside the program, this corresponds to verifying whether the message Alice.M can
be derived from the intruder knowledge and whether any honest agent playing a role in R believes that
at least one of the other roles inR is indeed played by i, which we can read as having indeed i ∈R. The
following assertion is added at the end of the SiL program:
1 if ((IK |- Alice.M) and (not((Alice_1.B^1_1 = i) or
2 ... (Alice_1.B^1_m = i) or ...
3 (Alice_n.B^n_1 = i) or ... (Alice_n.B^n_m = i))))
4 then attack := true;
5 else skip;
where Alice_j, for 16 j6 n, is a role such that Alice_j∈R and si(Alice_j) 6= i, {Bob_1, . . . , Bob_m}⊆R
is the subset of those roles in R that are instantiated with i by si and Bjl, for 16 j 6 n and 16 l 6 m, is
the variable referring to the role Bob_l in the specification of the role Alice_j.
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Example 6. For NSL, assume that we want to verify the confidentiality of the variable Nb (contained in
the specification of Bob) between the roles in the set {Alice,Bob}. We can express this goal by appending
the assertion
1 if ((IK |- Bob.Nb) and (not(Bob.A = i)))
2 then attack := true;
3 else skip;
at the end of the program. 
Example 7. The program instances described in Example 4 give rise to the following three SiL pro-
grams, which have a single IK initialization instruction:
IK := {a,b,i,pk(a),pk(b),pk(i),inv(pk(i))}}
Program 1
1 S1_Alice.Actor := a;
2 S1_Alice.B := i;
3 S1_Alice.Na := c_0;
4
5 IK := IK + {{S1_Alice.Na,S1_Alice.Actor}_pk(S1_Alice.B)};
6
7 if (IK |- {S1_Alice.Na,[S1_Alice.Y_1,S1_Alice.B]}_pk(S1_Alice.Actor)
8 then S1_Alice.Nb := S1_Alice.Y_1;
9 else end;
10
11 IK := IK + {{S1_Alice.Nb}_pk(S1_Alice.B)};
12 witness(S1_Alice.Actor,S1_Alice.B,{S1_Alice.Nb}_pk(S1_Alice.B)}) := true;
Program 2
1 S2_Alice.Actor := a;
2 S2_Alice.B := b;
3
4 S2_Alice.Na := c_1;
5
6 IK := IK + {{S2_Alice.Na,S2_Alice.Actor}_pk(S2_Alice.B)};
7
8 if (IK |- {S2_Alice.Na,[S2_Alice.Y_1,S2_Alice.B]}_pk(S2_Alice.Actor))
9 then S2_Alice.Nb := S2_Alice.Y_1;
10 else end;
11
12 IK := IK + {{S2_Alice.Nb}_pk(S2_Alice.B)};
13 witness(S2_Alice.Actor,S2_Alice.B,{S2_Alice.Nb}_pk(S2_Alice.B)}) := true;
Program 3
1 S2_Bob.A := a;
2 S2_Bob.Actor := b;
3
4 if (IK |- {S2_Bob.Y_1,S2_Bob.Y_2}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor))
5 then S2_Bob.Na := S2_Bob.Y_1;
6 S2_Bob.A := S2_Bob.Y_2;
7 else end;
8
9 S2_Bob.Nb := c_2;
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11 IK := IK + {{S2_Bob.Na,[S2_Bob.Nb,S2_Bob.Actor]}_pk(S2_Bob.A)};
12
13 if (IK |- {S2_Bob.Nb}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor))
14 then
15 if (not(witness(S2_Bob.A, S2_Bob.Actor, {S2_Bob.Nb}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor)))
16 and
17 (not(S2_Bob.A = i)));
18 then attack := true;
19 else end;

3.3. Combining sessions
Now we need to define a global program that properly “combines” the programs related to all the
sessions in the scenario. The idea is that such a program allows for executing, in the proper order, all the
instructions of all the sessions in the scenario; the way in which instructions of different sessions are in-
terleaved will be determined by the value of further input variables, denoted by X (possibly subscripted),
which can be seen as choices of the intruder with respect to the flow of the execution. Namely, we start
to execute each session sequentially and we get blocked when we encounter the receipt of a message
sent by a role that is played by the intruder. When all the sessions are blocked on instructions of that
form, the intruder chooses which session has to be reactivated (by setting the variables X accordingly).
For what follows, it is convenient to see a sequential program as a graph (which can be simply ob-
tained by representing its control flow) on which the algorithm of Section 4 for symbolic execution and
annotation will be executed. We recall here some notions concerning programs and program runs.
Definition 6. A (SiL) program graph is a finite, rooted, labeled graph (Λ, l0,∆), where Λ is a finite set of
program locations, l0 is the initial location and ∆⊆ Λ×A×Λ is a set of transitions labeled by actions
from a set A, containing the assignments and conditional statements provided by the language SiL.
A (SiL) program path of length k is a sequence of the form l0,a0, l1,a1, . . . , lk, where each step
(l j,a j, l j+1) ∈ ∆ for 06 j < k−1.
Let ς0 be the initial data state. A (SiL) program run of length k is a pair (pi,ω), where pi is a program
path l0,a0, l1,a1, . . . , lk and ω = ς0, . . . ,ςk+1 is a sequence of data states such that < a j,ς j >⇓ ς j+1 for
06 j 6 k. 
Let S be a scenario of a protocol P with m program instances pi1, . . . ,pim. We can associate to each
program instance pi j, for 1 6 j 6 m, a sequential program by following the procedure described in
Section 3.2.
For each 1 6 j 6 m, we have a program graph G j = (Λ j, l j0,∆ j) corresponding to the program of
pi j. The program graph G corresponding to a given scenario is obtained by composing the graphs of
the single program instances. Below we describe an algorithm for concretely obtaining such a program
graph for S. For simplicity, we will assume that the original specification of P is such that no receipts
of messages are contained inside an if-statement.
Definition 7. Given a program graph, an intruder location is a location of the program graph corre-
sponding to the receipt of a message.
A block of a program graph G ′ is a subgraph of G ′ such that its initial location is either the initial
location of G ′ or an intruder location.
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The exit locations of a block B are the locations of B with no outgoing edges.
A program graph can simply be seen as a sequence of blocks. Namely, we can associate to the program
graph G j, for each 1 6 j 6 m, its block structure, i.e., a sequence B j1, . . . ,B jn of blocks of G j, such that:
(i) the initial location of B j1 is the initial location of G j; (ii) each intruder location of G j is the initial
location of B jk for some 16 k 6 m; (iii) for 16 k < n, the initial location of B jk+1 coincides, in G j, with
an exit location of B jk; (iv) the program graph obtained by composing B j1, . . . ,B jn, i.e., by letting the initial
location of B jk+1 coincide with the corresponding exit location of B jk , is G j itself. 
Intuitively, we decompose a session program graph G i into sequential blocks starting at each intruder
location. For instance, Program 1 of Example 7 can be divided into two parts giving rise to two distinct
blocks:
Block B11
1 S1_Alice.Actor := a;
2 S1_Alice.B := i;
3 S1_Alice.Na := c_0;
4 IK := IK + {{S1_Alice.Na,S1_Alice.Actor}_pk(S1_Alice.B)};
Block B12
1 if (IK |- {S1_Alice.Na,[S1_Alice.Y_1,S1_Alice.B]}_pk(S1_Alice.Actor)
2 then S1_Alice.Nb := S1_Alice.Y_1;
3 else end;
4
5 IK := IK + {{S1_Alice.Nb}_pk(S1_Alice.B)};
6 witness(S1_Alice.Actor,S1_Alice.B,{S1_Alice.Nb}_pk(S1_Alice.B)}) := true;
The idea is that each such block will occur as a subgraph in the general scenario program graph G
(possibly with more than one occurrence). Namely, the procedure for generating the scenario program
graph will create a program graph that allows one to execute all the blocks of the scenario just once, in
any possible sequence that respects the order of the single sessions, i.e., each possible interleaving of
blocks will be considered. For instance, if we assume to have the block structures (B11,B12) and (B21), the
resulting program graph will contain a path corresponding to the execution of B11,B12,B21 in this order, as
well as a path for B11,B21,B12 , as well as a path for B21,B11,B12 . Given a block, its main exit location is a
location with no outgoing edges such that in the original session graph it has an outgoing edge towards
an intruder location. Note that under the restriction on P introduced above (i.e., no receipts inside if-
statements), each block has at most one such location, while other (non-main) exit locations may arise
for the presence of end statements.
In Fig. 6, we give an algorithm that we have devised to incrementally build the program graph G =
(Λ, l0,∆) starting from the root and adding blocks step by step. We assume the number of program
instances m given. In the algorithm we use a procedure attach, which given a block B and a location
l, adds the subgraph B to G (by letting the initial location of B coincide with l) and updates the sets Λ
and ∆ accordingly. During the construction, the set T ⊆ Λ contains the locations of the program graph
to be still expanded. Two functions pc : Λ×{1, . . . ,m} → N and ic : Λ→ N are used to keep track of
the status of the construction. Their intended meaning is the following: assume that the location l in the
program graph is still to be expanded; then for each 16 j 6 m, B jpc(l, j) is the next block to be added for
what concerns the program instance pi j (i.e., each path going from the root to l has already executed B jh
for 16 h < pc(l, j)) and the next input variable to be used is Xic(l).
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Input: The set of session program graphs {G1, . . . ,Gm} related to a given scenario of a protocol. For 16 j 6 m, we refer to the block structure
of G j as the sequence B j1, . . . ,B jn j .
Output: The program graph G = (Λ, l0,∆) combining G1, . . . ,Gm.
create a location l;
Λ := {l};
l0 := l;
∆ := /0;
pc(l, j) := 1 for 16 j 6 m;
ic(l) := 1;
for h = 1 to m do {
if (initial location of Bh1 is not intruder location)
then {
attach Bh1 to l;
let l′ be the main exit location of Bh1 :
pc(l′, j) := pc(l, j) for all j 6= h;
pc(l′,h) := pc(l,h)+1;
ic(l′) := 1;
l := l′
}
}
T := {l};
do {
pick a location l ∈ T ;
for h = 1 to m do {
if (Bhpc(l,h) does exist) then {
create a location l∗;
Λ := Λ∪{l∗};
∆ := ∆∪{(l, X_k = h, l∗)}, where k = ic(l);
attach Bhpc(l,h) to l∗;
let l′ be the main exit location of Bhpc(l,h):
pc(l′, j) := pc(l, j) for all j 6= h;
pc(l′,h) := pc(l,h)+1;
ic(l′) := ic(l)+1;
T := T ∪{l′};
}
}
T := T \{l};
} while (T 6= /0);
Fig. 6. An algorithm for building the program graph combining more sessions.
The first for loop in the pseudo-code of the algorithm composes, in a sequence, the first blocks of
each session program graph. Then the while loop expands the program graph by adding a fork at each
intruder choice.
The resulting program graph G = (Λ, l0,∆), which is actually a tree, can be finally simplified by col-
lapsing indistinguishable nodes, according to standard graph and transition systems optimization tech-
niques based on minimization modulo bisimulation, as well as by omitting paths that do not lead to any
goal location.
Example 8. Fig. 10 shows the message sequence chart corresponding to one of the paths of the pro-
gram graph for NSL, in the scenario described in the previous examples. The entire graph (whose block
composition is shown in Fig. 7) is obtained by using the algorithm of Fig. 6 plus some optimization, as
described in the text above. The path highlighted in double lines in Fig. 7 is the one shown in Fig. 10. 
3.4. Correctness of the translation
Now, we show that the translation into SiL, defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, preserves important
properties of the original specification. In particular, we show that given an ASLan++ specification, an
attack state can be reached by analyzing its ASLan translation if and only if an attack state can be found
by executing its SiL translation.
Equivalence of single steps.
Definition 8. We say that an ASLan term M′ and a SiL term M′′ are equivalent, M′ ∼M′′, iff one of the
following conditions holds:
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• M′ ≡ c′, M′′ ≡ c′′ and c′ = c′′;
• M′ ≡ pair(M′1,M′2), M′′ ≡ [M′′1 ,M′′2 ] and M′1 ∼M′′1 , M′2 ∼M′′2 ;
• M′ ≡ crypt(M′1,M′2), M′′ ≡ {M′′2}M′′1 and M′1 ∼M′′1 , M′2 ∼M′′2 ;• M′ ≡ scrypt(M′1,M′2), M′′ ≡ {|M′′2 |}M′′1 and M′1 ∼M′′1 , M′2 ∼M′′2 ;• M′ ≡ inv(M′1), M′′ ≡ inv(M′′1 ) and M′1 ∼M′′1 .
where ≡ denotes syntactic equality. 
In the following, we consider an ASLan++ program and the corresponding ASLan translation. In order
to do that, we will define and use some auxiliary functions that will help relate ASLan and SiL notions.
First of all, as described in Section 2.3, we recall that for each predicate symbol in the SignatureSection
we will have a corresponding state fact.
Definition 9. We define a variable mapping as a function f (E,A) that given an entity name E and a
variable name A returns the value i corresponding to the index of the position of variable A in the state
fact state_E. 
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Note that such a function always exists and it is implicitly created at translation time by the translation
procedure from ASLan++ into ASLan described in Section 2.3.
Let pi1, . . . ,pin be the program instances of the considered protocol scenario and let S be any ASLan
state in the corresponding ASLan description. We can assume to have a further function g that will be
used to denote the identifier of a given session instance. Namely, we define g( j) = SID, where SID is
the identifier contained in the state fact state_Session_j(...,SID, ...) ∈ S, i.e., the state fact that represents
in S the symbolic session corresponding to the program instance pi j. Note that such a function is im-
plicitly created when a symbolic session is instantiated (Section 2.3) and it is bijective. Furthermore, we
introduce some notation in order to be able to refer to specific values in the state of an arbitrary entity
E. Namely, given a session instance j, we will write S(E j, i) to denote the value vi of the state predicate
state_E(v1, ID, ...,vn) such that child(g(j), ID) ∈ S. The last condition on the predicate child ensures that
we refer to the value of the entity in the appropriate session instance ( j in this case).
Definition 10. We say that an ASLan state S and a SiL state ς are equivalent, S∼ ς , iff:
• for each SiL ground term M′ and ASLan ground term M′′ such that M′ ∼M′′, M′ ∈ DY (ς(IK))⇔
iknows(M′′)⊆ dSeH ;
• ς(Sj_E.A) = S(E j, f (E,A)) for each E representing an entity name involved in the protocol, for
each A representing an ASLan++ variable name or parameter name of entity E, for each session
instance si j
• ς(attack) = true⇔ attack ⊆ dSeH ;
• (M,M1,M2) ∈ ς(witness)⇔ witness(M′,M′1,M′2, . . .)⊆ dSeH , where M, M1 and M2 are SiL ground
terms and M′, M′1 and M
′
2 are ASLan ground terms such that M ∼M′, M1 ∼M′1 and M2 ∼M′2. 
We notice that while an ASLan transition occurs when there exists a substitution (of values for vari-
ables) that makes a rule applicable, in SiL we simulate, and in a sense make more explicit, such a
substitution by using the Y input variables. This establishes a correspondence between ASLan substitu-
tions and assignments of values to SiL input variables, which will be important in the following proofs,
and that we will handle by means of the following notion of extension of a SiL state.
Definition 11. Given a SiL state ς and a set of input variables Y1, ...,Yn such that ς(Yi) is undefined, we
define an extension ς¯ of ς as a SiL state, where ς¯ is defined for Y1, ...,Yn and for each other variable A,
ς¯(A) = ς(A). 
Since the input variables of the form Yi are not involved in the definition of equivalence, if an ASLan
state S and a SiL state ς are equivalent (i.e., S ∼ ς ), and ς¯ is an extension of ς , then also S and ς¯ are
equivalent (i.e., S∼ ς¯ ).
Let r be an ASLan rule; we will write S r−→ S′ iff there exists a transition from an ASLan state S to an
ASLan state S′ obtained by applying the rule r.
Lemma 1. Let I be an ASLan++ statement, r the corresponding ASLan rule and w the corresponding
SiL code, as defined in Section 2.3 and 3.2, respectively. Given an ASLan state S and a SiL state ς such
that S∼ ς we have:
(1) If S r−→ S′ then there exists an extension ς¯ of ς such that < w, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′ and S′ ∼ ς ′;
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(2) If there exists an extension ς¯ of ς such that < w, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′, then either there exists an S′ such that
S r−→ S′ and S′ ∼ ς ′ or S∼ ς ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by considering all the possible ASLan++ statements and is given in Ap-
pendix B. 
Equivalence of runs. We have showed that, starting from equivalent states, the application of ASLan
rules and SiL code fragments that have been generated from the same ASLan++ statements leads to
states that are still equivalent. Now we will show that given an ASLan++ specification, for each run in
the SiL translation, there exists a sequence of corresponding ASLan rules in the ASLan translation.
In order to compare SiL actions and ASLan rules, a few things need to be taken into account. The
goal here is to define things in such a way that a step of execution in SiL corresponds exactly to a
step of execution in ASLan. First of all, we note that, strictly speaking, the translation of an ASLan++
statement into SiL is not always an atomic action, e.g., in the case of a receipt, the corresponding SiL
action comprises both a conditional and some assignments. This is not reflected in ASLan. In order to
make an easier comparison with the corresponding ASLan step, we thus collect such blocks of actions
into a single compound action. Moreover, if we consider a path in a SiL program graph, we encounter
conditional statements referring to Xi variables, i.e., those used in SiL to handle the interleaving between
sessions. These do not have a direct correspondent in terms of ASLan rules and will therefore not be
included in the following definition of a SiL action path.
Definition 12. Assume given a program graph G for a protocol P and a scenario S. A (SiL) compound
action is a sequence of SiL actions that correspond altogether to the translation of a single ASLan++
statement. A SiL action path (for G) is a sequence w0, . . . ,wk of SiL compound actions that label, in the
given order, the edges of a path of G.
We define a SiL action run (for G) as a pair (pi,ω), where pi = w0, . . . ,wk is a SiL action path and
ω = ς0, . . . ,ςk+1 is a sequence of data states such that < w j,ς j >⇓ ς j+1 for 06 j 6 k. 
We notice that the definition above does exclude Xi conditional statements as they do not come from
the translation of an ASLan++ rule and thus they are not considered compound actions. Now it is easy
to see that the notions of SiL program path and SiL action path are strictly related, as they both refer
to a path obtained by interleaving the program chunks of different sessions. Intuitively, given a program
graph, we have that to each SiL program path corresponds a SiL action path (obtained by “reading”
the actions on the edges of the SiL program path, removing the Xi-conditionals and possibly grouping
some consecutive atomic actions). The notion of action path is introduced because it allows for an easier
comparison with paths obtained as sequences of ASLan rules, as defined in the following.
Definition 13. Assume given a protocol P and let E1, . . . ,En be the entity names involved in P . We
denote with Ie ≡ Ie,1, . . . , Ie,me the sequence of ASLan++ statements corresponding to the entity Ee.
Given a scenario S, for each program instance pi( j), we denote with r je,1, . . . ,r je,me the sequence of
ASLan rules corresponding to Ie.
An ASLan path (for a protocol scenario S) is a sequence r0, . . . ,rk of ASLan rules such that:
• for each entity Ee, program instance pi( j) and 16 l 6 me, there is one and only one 06 i6 k such
that ri ≡ r je,l;
• for 06 i6 k, ri ≡ r je,l for some e, l and j;
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• for 06 i6 k, if state_E(...,sl, ...), where sl is the step label, is in the left-hand side of ri ≡ r je,l then
either sl = 1 or there exists h < i such that state_E(...,sl, ...) is in the right-hand side of rh and
rh ≡ r je,l−1. 
The intuition behind this definition is that, given an ASLan transition system, the set of ASLan paths
collects all the “potential” sequences of applications of ASLan rules, i.e., those admissible by only taking
care of respecting the order given by the step labels inside the rules, no matter how the rest of the state
evolves. The condition on the step labels is used to ensure that rules belonging to a same session are
applied in the correct order.
Definition 14. An ASLan run (for a protocol scenario S) is a pair (τ,ρ), where τ is an ASLan path
r0, . . . ,rk and ρ = S0, . . . ,Sk+1 is a sequence of ASLan states such that Si
ri−→ Si+1 for 06 i6 k. 
Definition 15. We say that an ASLan path r0, . . . ,rk and a SiL action path w0, . . . ,wk are equivalent iff
for each 06 i6 k, ri and wi can be obtained as the translation of the same ASLan++ statement. 
Lemma 2. Let S be a protocol scenario and G the corresponding program graph. Then: (i) for each
SiL action path w0, . . . ,wk for G, there exists an equivalent ASLan path r0, . . . ,rk for S; and, conversely,
(ii) for each ASLan path r0, . . . ,rk for S, there exists an equivalent SiL action path w0, . . . ,wk for G.
Proof. It is enough to observe that SiL action paths and ASLan paths follow, for a given program
instance, the order in which the actions are executed in the protocol: this is obtained by the definition of
the graph construction in the case of SiL, and by using step labels inside the rules in the case of ASLan.
Furthermore, in both cases, each possible interleaving between sessions is admitted, i.e., whenever in a
SiL path an action of the program instance pi(i) is followed by an action of the program instance pi( j),
there is a corresponding possible choice for a next rule r to be applied in ASLan such that r = r je,l for
some e and l; conversely, for each ASLan rule in an ASLan path letting one switch from a session i to a
session j, there is a corresponding branch where Xh = j giving rise to a corresponding SiL path. 
Theorem 1. For each SiL action run (pi,ω) of graph G corresponding to the protocol scenario S,
where ω = ς0, . . . ,ςk+1, there exists an ASLan run (τ,ρ) for S, where ρ = S0, . . . ,Sk+1, and ςi ∼ Si for
06 i6 k+1. The converse also holds.
Proof. Let ς0 be the data state obtained after the initialization block of the SiL program graph and S0
the ASLan initial state, as defined in Section 2. It is easy to check that ς0 ∼ S0. Then, the thesis follows
by using Lemma 2 (for each SiL action path, there is an equivalent ASLan path, and vice versa) and
Lemma 1 (equivalent steps preserve equivalence of states). 
Finally, we can use the previous theorem to show that an attack state can be found in an ASLan path
iff a goal location can be reached in the corresponding SiL path.
Corollary 1. Let S be a protocol scenario and G the corresponding program graph. An attack state can
be found in an ASLan path for S iff a goal location can be reached in a SiL action path for G.
Proof. Let S be an ASLan attack state, i.e., attack ⊆ dSeH . By Theorem 1, S is in an ASLan run for S
iff there exists ς ∼ S in a SiL action run for G. By Definition 10, ς(attack) = true, i.e., a goal location
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referring to the given attack has been reached. Since Theorem 1 holds in both directions, the converse is
also proved. 
4. An interpolation-based algorithm for verification
In this section, we present the interpolation-based algorithm that we use for verification and describe,
in particular, how we can calculate interpolants in our specific setting.
Our algorithm is a slightly simplified version of the IntraLA algorithm of [15], obtained by removing
some fields only used there to deal with program procedures. In a nutshell, the idea underlying our
algorithm is as follows. The input of our algorithm is a SiL program graph, as defined in Section 3.3,
together with a set of attacks (goals) to search for; the output is either the proof that no attack has
been found or an abstract attack trace for each attack found. The algorithm executes symbolically the
program graph searching for given goal locations, which in our case represent attacks found on the given
scenario of the protocol. In Fig. 8-left, we have depicted a simplified version of a generic program graph,
highlighting a location n from which a path leading to a goal location starts. In the case when we fail
to reach a goal during a search along an edge (Fig. 8-center), an annotation, i.e., a formula expressing
a condition under which no goal can be reached, is produced by using Craig interpolation. Informally
speaking, the annotation, iˆ in the figure, will be a formula implied by (a formula describing the state
originated by) the execution exec1 and inconsistent with (a formula describing the state reached at) the
goal location. Through a backtrack phase, such an annotation is propagated to the preceding nodes of the
edge and can be used to block a later phase of symbolic execution along an uninteresting run. Namely,
this will happen when the formula describing the state reached by such a later execution (exec2 in Fig. 8-
right) implies the annotation (where the absence of an annotation can be interpreted as false). In such
cases, we can in fact foresee that we are in a run that will not reach a goal.
4.1. Preliminary definitions
4.1.1. The annotation language
In what follows, we use a two-sorted first-order logic with equality, in which the graph annotations
will be expressed. The signature of the first sort is based on the algebra of messages defined in Section 2,
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over which we also allow a set of unary predicates DY jIK for 16 j6 n with a fixed n∈N, whose meaning
will be clarified below, and a ternary predicate witness. The signature of the second sort contains a set of
variables (denoted in our examples by X possibly subscripted) and uninterpreted constants (for which we
use integers as labels), and allows no functions and no predicates other than equality. We assume fixed
the sets of constants and denote by L(V) the set of well-formed formulas of such a two-sorted first-order
language defined over a (also two-sorted) set V of variables, which we will instantiate with the concrete
program variables of our SiL programs. For what concerns the semantics, the domain of the discourse
will be the set of possible data values of SiL. SiL data states, which are ultimately variable assignments,
can be seen as models.
4.1.2. Symbolic execution notions
Before presenting the algorithm, we introduce some notions concerning symbolic execution. In the
following, we will assume given a program graph (Λ, l0,∆).
Definition 16. Let V be the set of program variables. A symbolic data state is a triple (P,C,E), where
P is a (again, two-sorted) set of parameters, i.e., variables not in V , C ∈ L(P) is a constraint over the
parameters, and the environment E is a map from the program variables V to terms of the corresponding
sort defined over P, where, in particular, IK is mapped to a set of message terms and witness to a set of
triples of message terms. We write Ξ to denote the set of symbolic data states. 
Intuitively, a symbolic data state ξ represents a set of “concrete” (SiL) data states parametrically and
it can be characterized by the formula
χ(ξ ) =C ∧ (∧v∈V\{IK,witness,attack}(v = E(v))) ∧ (∧m∈E(IK)DY0IK(m)) ∧
(
∧
(m1,m2,m3)∈E(witness)witness(m1,m2,m3)) ∧
∧
E(attack)=true attack.
Note that the variable IK is treated in a particular way, i.e., we translate the fact that E(IK) =M for some
set M of parametric messages into a formula expressing that a predicate DY0IK holds for all the messages
in M.
Note also that E assigns a value (a term) to the program variables, but not to the parameters. It follows
that we can associate to each symbolic data state ξ the set ε(ξ ) of all the (concrete) data states obtained
from ξ by considering any valuation of the parameters that satisfies the constraint in χ(ξ ), i.e.,
ε(ξ ) = {ς ∈ D | ς |= ∃P .χ(ξ )} .
That is, a symbolic data state is connected, via ε , to a set of concrete data states Γ and, via χ , to a first-
order formula in L(V ); in turn, the models of such a formula are all the concrete data states in Γ. The
relationship between the mentioned notions can be summarized by means of the following diagram:
Ξ
χ
//
ε

L(V )
|=

2D
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We assume a defined initial symbolic data state ξ0 for which ε(ξ0) = {d0} (in this case, we have only
one concrete data state, as we can assume that the set of parameters is empty for ξ0).
Definition 17. A symbolic state is a pair (l,ξ ) ∈ Λ×Ξ. A symbolic interpreter SI :A→ Ξ→ Ξ, where
A is the set of SiL actions, is a total map such that for each symbolic data state ξ and action a, we have
ε(SI(a)(ξ )) = {ς ∈ D |< a,ς ′ ⇓ ς >, ς ′ ∈ ε(ξ )}. 
Intuitively, SI takes an action a and a symbolic data state ξ and returns a symbolic data state, which
represents the set of (concrete) data states obtained by executing the action a on ε(ξ ).
The previous definitions do not define explicitly a symbolic interpreter, but only specify that it has to
satisfy some conditions on the semantics of SiL. It is however not difficult to see that such a symbolic
interpreter indeed exists and can be easily defined constructively. This is in fact done concretely in our
implementation. We start with an empty set of parameters, an empty set of constraints and an empty
environment. Assignments modify the environment in a way that is specified by the operational seman-
tics of SiL (just consider that a value can now also be parametrical). Conditions in an if-statement, which
typically involve variables Xi or Yi, modify the constraint C, represented in the implementation as a set of
equalities and predicates of the form IK `M. When a new variable Xi or Yi is introduced in a conditional,
an equality between the variable and the corresponding parameter is also added in the environment. For
instance, let us consider the statement
4 if (IK |- {S2_Bob.Y_1,S2_Bob.Y_2}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor))
5 then S2_Bob.Na := S2_Bob.Y_1;
6 S2_Bob.A := S2_Bob.Y_2;
7 else end;
of Program 3 in Example 7. The symbolic execution of the conditional will consist in adding the pairs
(S2_Bob.Y _1,y1) and (S2_Bob.Y _2,y2) to the environment, and the predicate IK ` {y1,y2}pk(b) to the
constraint (we are assuming here that b is the value currently associated to S2_Bob.Actor in the envi-
ronment, while y1 and y2 are newly introduced parameters). The symbolic execution of the then branch
further updates the environment by adding to it the pairs (S2_Bob.Na,y1) and (S2_Bob.A,y2). These
steps correspond to steps 4−6 of Example 9, in which further details concerning our construction of a
symbolic interpreter will be presented.
4.1.3. IntraLA basic notions
Definition 18. An algorithm state is a triple (Q,A,G), where Q is the set of queries (where a query is a
symbolic state), A is a program annotation (or simply annotation, for short) and G⊆ Λ is the set of goal
locations that have not been reached. 
During the execution of the algorithm, the set of queries is used to keep track of which symbolic states
still need to be considered, i.e., of those symbolic states whose location has at least one outgoing edge
that has not been symbolically executed, and the annotation is a decoration of the graph used to prune
the search. Formally:
Definition 19. A program annotation is a set of pairs in (Λ∪∆)×L(V ). We will write these pairs in
the form l : φ or e : φ , where l is a location, e is an edge and φ is a formula called the label. We define
A(el) =
∨{φ | el : φ ∈ A} for el an edge or a location. 
We note here that an empty set of annotations A(el) = /0 evaluates to false.
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Definition 20. For an edge e = (lh,a, lh+1), the label e : φ is justified in A whenever for each data state
ς1 such that ς1 |= φ and < a,ς1 >⇓ ς2, we have ς2 |= A(lh+1). In that case, we write J (e : φ ,A).
Let Out(l) be the set of outgoing edges from a location l. The label l : φ is justified in A when, for all
edges e ∈ Out(l), there exists e : ψ ∈ A such that ψ is a logical consequence of φ .
An annotation is justified when all its elements are justified. 
A justified annotation is inductive and if it is initially justified, then it is an inductive invariant. The
algorithm maintains the invariant that A is always justified.
Definition 21. A query q = (l,ξ ) is blocked by a formula φ when ς |= φ for each ς ∈ ε(ξ ) and we then
write Bloc(q,φ).
The edge e is blocking the query q when Bloc(q,A(e)) and the location l is blocking the query q when
Bloc(q,A(l)). 
The algorithm also maintains, as invariants, the facts that no symbolic state (i.e, no query) in Q is
blocked and that for all goals l in G, we have A(l) = false.
4.2. The rules of our algorithm
The rules of our algorithm are given in Fig. 9.
4.2.1. Initialization
The first rule applied is always Init, which initializes the algorithm state, i.e., the algorithm starts from
the initial location, the initial symbolic data state, an empty annotation and a set G0 of goals to search
for, which is given as input together with the graph. After the application of Init, the rules Decide, Learn
and Conjoin can be applied whenever their side-conditions are satisfied.
4.2.2. Symbolic execution steps
The Decide rule is used to perform symbolic execution. By symbolically executing one program ac-
tion, it generates a new query (lh+1,ξh+1) from an existing one (q = (lh,ξh)). It may choose any edge
that is not blocking the query q and the symbolic successor state generated by the action a on such an
edge. If this generated query is itself not blocked, it is added to the query set.
4.2.3. Backtracking steps
When the symbolic execution using the Decide rule gets blocked, two rules are used for backtracking:
(i) Conjoin, which merges annotations coming from distinct branches; and
(ii) Learn, which generates annotations.
The rule Conjoin is used when all the outgoing edges of the location lh (in a query q) are blocking
q. The rule blocks the query q by labeling its location with the conjunction of the labels that block
the outgoing edges. If the location is a goal, then we can remove it from the set of remaining goals.
Moreover, the query is discarded from the set q.
Finally, if some outgoing edge e=(lh,a, lh+1) is not blocking the query q, but the symbolic step defined
by SI along that edge leads to a query blocked by A(lh+1), then the rule Learn is applied. Namely, this is
the case when the application of SI on ξh, with respect to the action a, would result in a symbolic data
state ξh+1 such that each model in ε(ξh+1) satisfies A(lh+1). In particular, when the annotation A(lh+1) of
the location to be reached is false, as it is the case when a location is encountered for the first time, the
rule is applied if ε(ξh+1) is empty, i.e., χ(ξh+1) is unsatisfiable.
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INITIALIZATION
{(l0,ξ0)}, /0,G0 Init
SYMBOLIC EXECUTION STEPS
q = (lh,ξh) ∈ Q
e = (lh,a, lh+1) ∈ ∆
¬Bloc(q,A(e))
ξh+1 = SI(a)(ξh)
¬Bloc((lh+1,ξh+1),A(lh+1))
Q,A,G
Q+(lh+1,ξh+1),A,G
Decide
BACKTRACKING STEPS
q = (lh,ξh) ∈ Q
¬Bloc(q,A(lh))
(∀e ∈ Out(lh).e : φe ∈ A∧Bloc(q,φe))
φ =
∧
{φe | e ∈ Out(lh)}
Q,A,G
Q −q,A+ lh : φ ,G− lh Conjoin
q = (lh,ξh) ∈ Q
e = (lh,a, lh+1) ∈ ∆
¬Bloc(q,A(e))
Bloc(q,φ)
J (e : φ ,A)
Q,A,G
Q,A+ e : φ ,G Learn
Fig. 9. Rules of the algorithm IntraLA with corresponding side conditions. Intuitively, the subscripts h and h+1 in l/ξ represent
the current and successive location/state respectively.
The Learn rule then infers a new label φ that blocks the edge, where the formula φ can be any formula
that both blocks the current query and is justified. We note that the fact that there exists such a formula
φ implies that the action a leads indeed to a blocked symbolic state, which is the reason why we do not
need to include this condition among the side-conditions of the rule. In fact, by the definition of blocked
query, Bloc(q,φ) implies ς |= φ for each ς ∈ ε(ξh). Furthermore, by the definition of a justified label,
J (e : φ ,A) implies that for each data state ς such that ς |= φ and < a,ς >⇓ ς ′, we have ς ′ |= A(lh+1).
It follows that, given ξh+1 = SI(a)(ξh), for each ς ′ ∈ ε(ξh+1), we have ς ′ |= A(lh+1), i.e., (lh+1,ξh+1) is
blocked by A(lh+1).
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In Section 4.3, we will explain how the formula φ can be obtained by exploiting the Craig interpolation
lemma.
4.3. The generation of interpolants
We have seen in Section 4.2 that the rule Learn (Fig. 9) requires the generation of a formula φ that
blocks the current query and is justified, to be used as an annotation. This can be obtained by using
the Craig interpolation lemma [19], which states that given two first-order formulas α and β such that
α ∧β is inconsistent, there exists a formula φ (their interpolant) such that α implies φ , φ implies ¬β
and φ ∈ L(α)∩L(β ), where for a formula γ , L(γ) denotes the first-order language defined over the
uninterpreted symbols occurring in γ .
We will first introduce some notions concerning the description of data states and actions in our
annotation language and then describe how to obtain, in our case, the formula φ as an appropriate
interpolant.
Let µ be a term, a formula, or a set of terms or of formulas. We write µ ′ for the result of adding
one prime to all the non-logical symbols in µ . Intuitively, v′ refers to the value of the variable v in
the target state of a transition. It is used in transition formulas, i.e., formulas in L(V ∪V ′). Since the
semantics of a SiL action (see Section 3.1) expresses how we move from a data state to another, we can
easily associate to it a transition formula. In the following, we will write Sem(a) to denote the transition
formula corresponding to the action a. For example, the semantics of the assignment of a constant c to a
variable V (Sem(V := c)) is V ′ = c.
In the context of our graphs, the most interesting case is when the action a is represented by a con-
ditional statement, with a condition of the form IK `M for some message M, which intuitively means
that the message M can be derived from a set of messages IK by using the rules of NDY of Fig. 1. In
our treatment, we fix a value n as the maximum number of inference steps that the intruder can execute
in order to derive M. This is a limitation of our method, which, as we already remarked in Section 2.1,
is however mitigated by several results (e.g., [9]) that show that, when terms are interpreted in the free
algebra and a finite number of sessions are considered, as in our case, it is indeed possible to set an upper
bound on the number of inference steps needed. Such a value can be established a priori by observing the
set of messages exchanged along the protocol scenario; we assume such an n to be fixed for the whole
scenario.4
We use formulas of the form DY jIK(M), for 06 j6 n, with the intended meaning that M can be derived
in j steps of inference by using the rules ofNDY . In particular, the predicate DY0IK is used to represent the
initial knowledge IK, before any inference step is performed. Under the assumption on the n mentioned
above, the statement IK `M can be expressed in our language as the formula DYnIK(M).
4The ability of the intruder of generating new messages can be simulated by enriching his initial knowledge with a set of
constants not occurring elsewhere in the protocol specification. Since we consider finite scenarios, the size of such a set can
also be bounded a priori.
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The formula
ϕ j = ∀M.(DY j+1IK (M)↔
(
DY jIK(M)
∨ (∃M′.DY jIK([M,M′])∨DY jIK([M′,M]))
∨ (∃M1,M2.M = [M1,M2]∧DY jIK(M1)∧DY jIK(M2))
∨ (∃M1,M2.M = {M1}M2 ∧DY jIK(M1)∧DY jIK(M2))
∨ (∃M′.DY jIK({M}M′)∧DY jIK(inv(M′))
∨ (∃M′.DY jIK({M}inv(M′))∧DY jIK(M′))
∨ (∃M1,M2.M = {|M1|}M2 ∧DY jIK(M1)∧DY jIK(M2))
∨ (∃M′.DY jIK({|M|}M′)∧DY jIK(M′))
)
,
in which↔ denotes the double implication and every quantification has to be intended over the sort of
messages, expresses (as a disjunction) all the ways in which a given message can be obtained by the
intruder in one inference step, i.e., by a single application of one of the rules in the system NDY , thus
moving from a knowledge (denoted by the predicate) DY jIK to a knowledge (denoted by the predicate)
DY j+1IK .
A theory TMsg(n) over the sort of messages is obtained by enriching classical first-order logic with
equality with the axioms ϕ j, for 16 j < n, together with an additional set of axioms that formalize that in
the free algebra of messages any two distinct ground terms are not equal, e.g., ∀M1.M2.M3.M4.([M1,M2] 6=
{M3}M4).
Our translation of the program statement IK `M into the formula DYnIK(M) is justified by the follow-
ing result. This is proved by induction on the height of a derivation tree Π in the system DY (IK), which
is defined as the greatest number of successive applications of rules in Π.
Theorem 2. Let M be a ground message, n ∈ N, IK a set of ground messages and I an interpretation
of TMsg(n) such that IK = I(DY0IK). Then I satisfies the formula DYnIK(M) iff there exists a derivation of
M ∈ DY (IK) of height at most n+1 in the system NDY .
Proof. (⇒) Assume that the interpretation I satisfies the formula DYnIK(M), denoted I |=DYnIK(M). We
proceed by induction on n. If n= 0, then we have I |= DY0IK(M), i.e., M ∈ I(DY0IK)which by hypothesis
gives M ∈ IK. But then there exists a derivation inNDY of M ∈DY (IK), obtained by a single application
of the rule Gaxiom. Now assume we have proved the assertion for n = j−1 and consider n = j. Since I
satisfies the premise of the left-to-right implication in ϕ j−1, i.e., DY jIK(M), then it must also satisfy one
of the disjuncts in the conclusion. We have a case for each disjunct. We consider two of them; the others
are similar. (i) Let I |= DY j−1IK (M). By induction hypothesis, there exists a derivation of M ∈ DY (IK) in
NDY of height at most j, which is the derivation we were looking for. (ii) Let I |= ∃M′.DY j−1IK ([M,M′])∨
DY j−1IK ([M
′,M]). We can assume there exists a message M′ such that I |=DY j−1IK ([M,M′]) (the other case
is symmetrical). By induction hypothesis, there exists a derivation of [M,M′]∈DY (IK) inNDY of height
at most j. A further application of Apairi gives a derivation of M ∈ DY (IK) of height at most j+1.
(⇐) Again, we proceed by induction on n. If n = 0, the only admissible derivation of M ∈ DY (IK)
is the one given by an application of Gaxiom. It follows that M ∈ IK. Then IK = I(DY0IK) implies I |=
DY0IK(M). Now let us consider n = j and assume we have a derivation of M ∈ DY (IK) of length at most
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j+1. Let r be the last rule applied. We have one case for each rule inNDY . Let r be Gpair. It follows that
we have two derivations, of length at most j, of M1 ∈ DY (IK) and M2 ∈ DY (IK), respectively, where
M = [M1,M2]. By induction hypothesis, we have I |= DY j−1IK (M1) and I |= DY j−1IK (M2), which implies
that I satisfies one of the disjuncts in the premise of the right-to-left implication of ϕ j−1. It follows that
its conclusion must also be satisfied, i.e., I |= DY jIK(M). The other cases can be treated similarly. 
Now let α = χ(ξh) and β = Sem(a)∧¬A(lh+1)′. Then we can obtain the formula φ we are looking for,
during an application of the rule Learn, as an interpolant for α and β , possibly by using an interpolating
theorem prover. With regard to this, we observe that, in the presence of our finite scenario assumption,
when mechanizing such a search, the problem can be simplified by restricting the domain to a finite set
of messages.
4.4. Output and correctness of the algorithm
The algorithm terminates when no rules can be applied, which implies that the query set is empty.
We note that the algorithm always terminates (after a full exploration of the paths in the program graph,
in the worst case) as it is just an optimization over the standard symbolic execution algorithm. In [15],
the correctness of the algorithm, with respect to the goal search, is proved: the proof given there applies
straightforwardly for the slightly simplified version we have given here.
Theorem 3. Let G0 be the set of goal locations provided in input. If the algorithm terminates with the
algorithm state ( /0,A,G), then all the locations in G0 \G are reachable and all the locations in G are
unreachable.
The output of our method can be of two types. If no goal has been reached, i.e., G0 ⊆G, then we have
a proof of the fact that no attack can be found, with respect to the security property of interest, in the
finite scenario that we are considering. Otherwise, for each reachable goal location, i.e., in G0 \G, we
can generate an abstract attack trace. We also note that, by a trivial modification of the rule Conjoin, we
can easily obtain an algorithm that keeps searching for a given goal even when this has already been
reached through a different path, thus allowing for extracting more attack traces for the same goal on a
given scenario.
Such traces can be inferred from the information deducible from the symbolic data state (P,C,E)
corresponding to the last step of execution. We proceed as follows. First of all, we can reconstruct the
order in which sessions have been interleaved. This information is given by the value of the parameters
corresponding to the variables X j, for j an integer, which are specified in the constraint C. This allows us
to obtain the sequence of messages exchanged, expressed in terms of program variables. Then, by using
the maps in E, each such a variable can be associated to a function over the set of parameters P, and
possibly further specified by the constraints over the parameters in C. It follows that the final result will
be a sequence of messages where all the variables have been replaced by (functions over) parameters.
Such a sequence constitutes our attack trace. In the case when the value of some parameter is not fully
specified by the conditions in C, we have a parametrical attack trace, which can be instantiated in more
than one way. A concrete example of this can be found in Example 9.
Example 9. We continue our running example by showing the execution of the algorithm on some
interesting paths of the graph defined in Section 3.2 for the protocol NSL: Table 1 summarizes the
algorithm execution.
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For readability, we have not reported the evolution of parameters and goals set. We remark that each
new parameter is added to the parameters set once used and the goals set is initialized with the goal
locations corresponding to the translation of the authentication goal auth (see Section 3.2 for details)
but, given that no goal is reached, the goals set does not change during the execution of the algorithm.
Note that in the table we use statements of the form IK `M in the constraint set as an abbreviation for
the formulas over the parameters that make the (translation of the) statement satisfiable, according to
the definition above. Qi, Ci and Ei denote, respectively, the set of queries, the set of constraints and the
environment at step i of the execution. We have also used # to indicate the step number and R to indicate
which rule is applied.
The first path we show (summarized by the message sequence chart in Fig. 10) reaches a goal loca-
tion with an unsatisfiable state and then annotates it with an interpolant, while the other ones reach
the previously annotated path and then block their executions (thus saving some execution steps). The
algorithm starts, as described in Table 1, by using the Init rule to initialize the algorithm state and then
it symbolically executes the program graph from query (l0,ξ0) to (l18,ξ18) using the Decide rule (steps
0–19). For readability, in Tab. 1 and Fig. 10, all the variables (along with IK) are initialized in location
l0.
In step 20, the algorithm blocks its symbolic execution because the edge (l19, l20) is labeled with the
goal action for an authentication goal and any possible symbolic execution step leads to a blocked
symbolic data state (i.e., the location reached has no other outgoing edges).
We now show how the algorithm calculates an interpolant and how it is propagated annotating the
graph (to prevent the execution of paths that will not reach a goal location). Afterwards, we discuss
how the constraints imposed by the interpolant translate to the NSL protocol and why it prevents the
executions of paths that would not reach the goal location.
The backtrack phase starts and, until step 33, the algorithm creates interpolants to annotate the pro-
gram graph and then it propagates annotations up to the location l14 (where the symbolic execution
restarts with the Decide rule, but we have not shown it in Table 1 for lack of space).
As shown in Fig. 11, there are two other paths that reach location l18.5 Each path that reaches this
location has already executed an action of the form IK ` {NA,NB,B}pk(A) (second session where both
Alice and Bob are played by honest agents). As described in [7], it is impossible for the DY intruder
to create a message of the form {NA,NB,B}pk(A) from its knowledge (IK) if the intruder is not explicitly
playing the role of the sender, i.e., A. Note that, the intruder receives the message {NA,NB,B}pk(A) but if
he does not play the role of A, he can only forward the message (i.e., there is no way for the intruder to
know the components NA and NB) and this contradicts the witness predicate in the goal (if the intruder
forwards all the messages there is no violation of the authentication property).
This means that each symbolic state that reaches location l18 implies the interpolant S2_Bob.A = i.
This is a concrete example of how the annotation method can help (and improve) the search procedure:
in NSL we can stop following every path that reaches location l18 as the annotation method ensures that
we will never reach a goal location.
While with NSL the algorithm concludes with no attacks found, if we consider the original protocol
NSPK (i.e., remove Lowe’s addition of “B” in the second message of the protocol), then our method
reaches the goal location with an execution close to the one we have just provided. In fact, in NSPK, when
we compute the step after the 19th, the intruder rules lead to the goal with the inequality S2_Bob.A 6= i.
5Note that, for readability, we have sequentially enumerated the locations encountered in this example. In particular, the
locations 17−20 of Figure 11 correspond, respectively, to the locations 77,35−37 of Figure 7.
34 M.Rocchetto, L.Viganò, M.Volpe / An interpolation-based method for the verification of security protocols
(0,1) S1_A
lice.A
ctor := a
         S1_A
lice.B
 := i
         S1_A
lice.N
a := c_0
         S2_A
lice.A
ctor := a
S2_A
lice.B
 := b
         S2_A
lice.N
a := c_1
S2_B
ob.A
 := a
         S2_B
ob.A
ctor := b
IK
 := {a, b, i, pk(a), pk(b), pk(i), inv(pk(i))}
(1,2) IK
 := IK
 +{{S1_A
lice.N
a,S1_A
lice.A
ctor}_pk(S1_A
lice.B
)
                           {S2_A
lice.N
a,S2_A
lice.A
ctor}_pk(S2_A
lice.B
)}
(2,3)
X
1=3
(3,4) IK
 |- {{S2_B
ob.Y
_1,S2_B
ob.Y
_2}_pk(S2_B
ob.A
ctor)}
(4,5) S2_B
ob.N
a := S2_B
ob.Y
_1
(5,6) S2_B
ob.A
 := S2_B
ob.Y
_2
(6,7) S2_B
ob.N
b := c_2
(7,8) IK
 := IK
 + {{S2_B
ob.N
a,S2_B
ob.N
b,S2_B
ob.A
ctor}_pk(S2_B
ob.A
)}
(9,10) IK
 |- {{S2_A
lice.N
a,S2_A
lice.Y
_1,S2_A
lice.B
}_pk(S2_A
lice.A
ctor)}
(10,11) S2_A
lice.N
b := S2_A
lice.Y
_1
(11,12) IK
 := IK
 + {{S2_A
lice.N
b}_pk(S2_A
lice.B
)}
(12,13) w
itness(<S2_A
lice.A
ctor, S2_A
lice.B
, {S2_A
lice.N
b}_pk(S2_A
lice.B
)>)
(14,15) IK
 |- {{S1_A
lice.N
a,S1_A
lice.Y
_1,S1_A
lice.B
}_pk(S1_A
lice.A
ctor)}
(15,16) S1_A
lice.N
b := S1_A
lice.Y
_1
(16,17) IK
 := IK
 + {{S1_A
lice.N
b}_pk(S1_A
lice.B
)}
(17,18) w
itness(<S1_A
lice.A
ctor, S1_A
lice.B
, {S1_A
lice.N
b}_pk(S1_A
lice.B
)> )
(18,19) IK
 |- {S2_B
ob.N
b}_pk(S2_B
ob.A
ctor)}
(19,20) A
uthentication goal
w
itness(<S2_B
ob.A
, S2_B
ob.A
ctor,
 {S2_B
ob.N
b}_pk(S2_B
ob.A
ctor)>) == true
A
N
D
 S2_B
ob.A
 != i 
a
b
i
(8,9)
X
11=2
(13,14)
X
9=1
(18,19)
X
4=3
Fig.
10.:
M
essage
sequence
chart
for
one
execution
path
of
the
N
SL
exam
ple.
T
he
actions
executed
in
(0,1)
and
(1,2)
have
been
grouped
togetherforreadability.
M.Rocchetto, L.Viganò, M.Volpe / An interpolation-based method for the verification of security protocols 35
34
18
17
19
20
48
goal
IK |- {S2_Bob.Nb}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor)S2_Bob.A=i
S2_Bob.A=i
Fig. 11. NSL sub-graph.
This is because the intruder i can perform a man-in-the-middle attack using the initiator entity of the
first session in order to decrypt the messages that the receiver sends to i in the second one [7]. To
show the attack trace, we first check the path that is used during the algorithm execution to reach the
goal location and that is represented by the values of X j parameters contained in the C19 set. In this
case, {X11 = 2, X9 = 1} ⊆ C19, which produces the symbolic attack trace (at state 19 of the algorithm
execution) shown in the middle of Fig. 2.
Now, by using the information in ξ19, we can instantiate this trace using parameter and constant
values, and thus obtain the instantiated attack trace shown on the right of Fig. 2. We can note from IK19
that Y2 has no constraints on the fact that it has to be i, i.e., the intruder acts as if it were an honest
agent (under his real name) in the first session, and then we write the concretization as i(a) to show that
the intruder is acting as the honest agent a in the second session and this makes the man-in-the-middle
attack possible.
It is also not difficult to extract from this instantiated attack trace a test case, which can then be applied
to test the actual protocol implementation. In fact, the constraint set contains a sequence of equalities of
the form Xi = n, which specify the session to be followed at each branch of the executed path. 
5. The SPiM tool
In order to show that our method concretely speeds up the validation, we have implemented a Java pro-
totype called SPiM (Security Protocol interpolation Method), which is available at http://regis.di.univr.
it/spim.php. As shown in Fig. 12, SPiM takes an ASLan++ specification as input that is automatically
translated into a SiL program graph by the translator ASLan++2Sil. The program graph is then given
as input to the Verification Engine (VE), which verifies the protocol by searching for goal locations that
represent attacks on the protocol. The VE is composed of three main components:
(i) a quantifier elimination module,
(ii) DY intruder and EUF (Equalities and Uninterpreted Functions) theories and
(iii) the tools Z3 [30] and iZ3 [31], used for SAT solving and interpolant generation, respectively.
Both Z3 and iZ3 are invoked by SPiA (Security Protocol interpolation Algorithm), which is our imple-
mentation of the algorithm in Section 4. Quantifier elimination and the definition of theories are related
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Fig. 12. The SPiM tool.
to the usage of Z3 and iZ3. In fact, as shown in Section 4, our algorithm needs to handle many quantifi-
cations and, for performance issues, a module that unfolds each quantifier over the finite set of possible
messages has been developed. Moreover, the DY theory has been properly axiomatized (with respect to
each formula produced by SPiA) in Z3 and iZ3, which do not support it by default.
More specifically, the VE symbolically executes a program graph. After the execution of an action
branching from a node to the next one, it produces a formula, which represents the symbolic state
reached. Z3 is then used for a satisfiability check on the newly produced formula. When the symbolic
execution of a given path fails to reach a goal, the VE calls iZ3, which generates an annotation (i.e.,
a formula expressing a condition under which no goal can be reached from the current state) by using
Craig’s interpolation. By a backtracking phase, SPiA propagates the annotation through the program
graph. Such an annotation is possibly used to block a later phase of symbolic execution along an un-
interesting run, as explained in Section 4. SPiM concludes reporting either all the different reachable
attack states (from which abstract attack traces can be extracted) or that no attack has been found for the
given specification.
5.1. Experiments and results
We considered 7 case studies and compared the results obtained by using interpolation-driven explo-
ration (SPiA) and full exploration (Full-explore) of the program graph. Full-explore explores the entire
graph checking, at each step, if the state is satisfiable or not. If there is an inconsistency, SPiM blocks
the execution of the path resuming from the first unexplored path, until it has explored all paths.6
Table 2 shows the results obtained (with a general purpose computer), by making explicit the time re-
quired for symbolic execution steps (applications of Decide) and for interpolant generation (applications
of Learn). The usage of SPiA has allowed us to speed up the validation (in the context of security pro-
tocols, i.e, using the DY intruder) by (i) reducing the number of states to explore and then (ii) lowering
the execution time. The relation between (i) and (ii) is due to the fact that the time needed to perform a
Decide is comparable to the one required to perform a Learn, and the time used to propagate the anno-
tations (Conjoin rule) is negligible. For example, the time needed to symbolically execute a (sub-)path
twice, using Full-explore, is comparable to the time used to execute and annotate the same (sub-)path.
But from that point on, if the annotation blocks the execution, only the Full-explore will execute that
6It would be possible to modify the Full-explore algorithm and check for inconsistencies at the end of the path instead of
at any step but this would lead to an unfair comparison. In fact, a similar improvement could have been implemented also
for SPiM, but then it would be difficult to distinguish between the steps pruned by interpolation and those pruned by such an
improvement.
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Table 2
SPiA vs Full-explore.
Specification (sessions) SPiA: Decide+Learn (time) Full-explore: Decide (time) Speedup % Result
ISO6 (ab,ab) 311+274 (205m6s) 467* (278m12s) -26.28 % no attack found
NSL (ab,ab) 257+234 (57m37s) 631 (173m7s) -66.71 % no attack found
NSL (ai,ab) 89+22 (1m30s) 119 (1m49) -17.43 % no attack found
NSL (ai,ab, ib)7 440+348 (93m51s) 619* (137m23s) -31.68% no attack found
NSPK (ab,ab) 257+234 (26m5s) 631 (76m20s) -65.82 % no attack found
NSPK (ai,ab) 101+22 (0m56s) 123 (0m51s) +8.92 % attack found
Helsinki (ab,ab) 311+274 (112m7s) 660* (261m47s) -57.17 % no attack found
Helsinki (ai,ab) 167+88 (13m41) 407 (46m44s) -70.72 % attack found
(sub-)graph again. We have observed that, in the case studies analyzed, the annotations block the execu-
tions of all those (sub-)paths that do not reach a goal location, thus ensuring a clear improvement of the
performances. In particular, when applying a Decide moving from a node l1 to a node l2, we generate
a formula that describes the state of the execution at node l2 and the axiomatization of the DY theory;
this formula is then given to Z3 that “decides” whether it is satisfiable or not. On the other hand, in
order to execute a Learn between the same S1 and S2, we translate the state S1 with the axiomatized DY
theory into a formula α and the semantics of the action a together with all previous annotations into a
formula β . In order to find an interpolant we use iZ3 that performs a satisfiability check on the formula
α∧β (very similar to what a Decide would do) and from the refutation by resolution steps an interpolant
can be calculated in linear time [14, 32]. Finally, the Conjoin rule propagates these interpolants without
performing other satisfiability checks.
Empirically, the more the program graph grows, the more the annotations prune the search space.
This is due to the fact that the number of states pruned by interpolation is usually related to the size of
a program graph; this is confirmed by the results in Table 2 and, in particular, by the case studies for
which Full-explore has not concluded the execution (marked with an asterisk).
We have also compared the SPiM tool with the three state-of-the-art model checkers for security
protocols that are part of the AVANTSSAR platform [1]: CL-AtSe [21], OFMC [3] and SATMC [22].8
Not surprisingly, Table 3 shows that their average computational times of execution are in general better
than ours. This is mainly due to several speed-up techniques implemented by these model checkers
and to empirical conditions that can stop the execution (both not implemented yet in SPiM). Table 3
also shows the number of transitions and/or nodes reached during the validations with the exception of
SATMC, which does not report them as output. However, for each safe specification (in which no attacks
are found), SATMC reached the maximum number of steps (80) permitted as default and the reported
timings are comparable to those obtained by SPiM for some specifications; in the case when they are
not comparable, it is interesting to observe that SPiM executes a number of rules much higher than 80.
For both CL-AtSe and OFMC, on safe specifications, the number of transitions and nodes explored is,
in most cases, higher than the number of rules (transitions) of SPiM (Table 2). On unsafe specifications
7Evaluation performed to show the scaling behavior for 3 sessions.
8For this comparison, given that all these tools support ASLan++, we have used the same input files and we have also used
the same general purpose computer used to generate the results in Table 2. We have considered OFMC v2012c, which is the last
version that supports ASLan++ although it only supports untyped analysis, while for SATMC and CL-AtSe we have considered
versions 3.4 and 2.5-21, respectively, which support typed analysis as SPiM does. Note that the times shown in Table 2 also
consider the translation from ASLan++ to SiL program graph (usually several seconds), while in Table 3 we do not show the
translation time from ASLan++ to ASLan (the input supported by the three tools), which is usually less than one second.
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Table 3
SATMC, CL-AtSe and OFMC.
Specification (sessions) SATMC (v.3.4) CL-AtSe (v.2.5-21) OFMC (v.2012c) Result
time transitions states time nodes time
ISO6 (ab,ab) 6.318s 452 236 0.034s 8432 3.804s no attack found
NSL (ab,ab) 14m28s 794 534 0.052s 3236 3.295s no attack found
NSL (ai,ab) 6m51s 93 69 0.015s 575 0.327s no attack found
NSPK (ab,ab) 14m10s 794 534 0.053s 8180 3.208s no attack found
NSPK (ai,ab) 1m56s 14 10 0.014s 96 0.134s attack found
Helsinki (ab,ab) 7.01s 794 534 0.061s 8180 3.795s no attack found
Helsinki (ai,ab) 50.8s 14 10 0.017s 96 0.121s attack found
(where an attack is found), these numbers seem to be in disfavor of SPiM but this is because SATMC,
OFMC and CL-AtSe stop their executions once a goal is found, while SPiM searches for every possible
attack trace in the program graph (i.e., SPiM features a multi-attack-trace support).
We remark that the aim of SPiM is mainly to show that Craig’s interpolation can be used as a speed-up
technique also in the context of security protocols and not (yet) to propose an efficient implementation
of a model checker for security protocol verification. In fact, we do not see our approach as an alter-
native to such more mature and widespread tools, but we actually expect some interesting and useful
interaction. For example, CL-AtSe implements many optimizations, like simplification and rewriting of
input specifications, and OFMC implements some optimizations at the intruder level as well as a specific
technique, called constraint differentiation (CDiff), which considerably prunes the state space (it is more
or less equivalent to partial-order reduction techniques typical of model checking, where the reduction
is “pushed” to the constraint solving procedure). Moreover, both CL-AtSe and OFMC implement the
step compression and protocol simplifications techniques, which merge together some of the actions
performed in the protocol.
We do not see any incompatibility in using interpolation together with such optimization techniques.
For instance, CDiff prunes the state space by not considering the same state twice, whereas interpolation
works on reducing the search space by excluding some paths during the analysis (i.e., it prunes the
execution of some of the paths). Moreover, based on the idea that the intruder controls the network,
when the intruder sends a message (IK `M) to an honest agent and the honest agent sends back a reply
(IK := IK+{M}), step compression merges the two into a single step. This would reduce the state space
but not prevent SPiM from generating and using interpolants.
The only possible side effect that we foresee in using interpolation together with such optimization
techniques is that the number of paths pruned by interpolation could decrease when we use it in com-
bination with other techniques. In general, however, although we don’t have experimental evidence yet,
we expect that if enhanced with such techniques, SPiM could then reach even higher speed-up rates. We
are currently working in this direction.
5.2. Analysis of the interpolants generated
The interpolants we have considered so far (with our running example) are quite simplistic for read-
ability reasons. However, the interpolants generated by SPiM can be rather complex formulae (i.e., with
hundreds of connectives and variables). In the remainder of this section, in order to give an insight of
the kind of information that can occur in an annotation, we describe the details of some of the inter-
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Table 4
NSL – SiL path execution
ID Prog. Communication Intruder Action
1 P2 A -> B IK := IK+{S2_Alice.Na,S2_Alice.Actor}_pk(S2_Alice.B)
2 P3 A -> B IK ` {S2_Bob.Na,S2_Bob.A}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor)
3 P3 B -> A IK := IK+{S2_Bob.Na,S2_Bob.Nb,S2_Bob.Actor}_pk(S2_Bob.A)
4 P2 B -> A IK ` {S2_Alice.Na,S2_Alice.Nb,S2_Alice.B}_pk(S2_Alice.Actor)
5 P2 A -> B IK := IK+{S2_Alice.Nb}_pk(S2_Alice.B)
6 P3 A -> B IK ` {S2_Bob.Nb}_pk(S2_Bob.Actor)
7 P3 goal: S2_Bob.A 6= i ∧
witness(S2_Bob.A -> S2_Bob.Actor : {S2_Bob.Nb}_pk(S2_Bob.B))
polants generated during the execution of SPiA on the running example. Specifically, an interpolant can
be composed of two different types of constraints:
• constraints over the knowledge of the intruder; and
• constraints over the instantiation of variables (e.g., constraining session instantiations).
Before going into the details of the interpolants, we recall that in the running example we have con-
sidered two sessions:
• Session 1: Alice = a, Bob = i
• Session 2: Alice = a, Bob = b
Note that when we generate the SiL graph, we consider one program for each role in each session, but
we don’t consider programs for the entities played by the intruder. Therefore, we combine three different
programs, one for the first session (i.e., considering Alice and not Bob, since the latter is played by the
intruder) and two for the second session as follows:
• P1: Session 1, Role Alice (S1_Alice.Actor = a, S1_Alice.B = i)
• P2: Session 2, Role Alice (S2_Alice.Actor = a, S2_Alice.B = b)
• P3: Session 2, Role Bob (S2_Bob.A = a, S2_Bob.Actor = b)
For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder of this section we focus on interpolants that either constrain
the intruder knowledge or the instantiation of other variables, but nothing prevents an interpolant from
combining the two types of constraints.
Interpolants constraining the intruder knowledge.. We illustrate this type of interpolant by considering
the execution path of the NSL running example detailed in Table 4. The execution path is the one given
in Example 9 (and in Table 1) but it focuses on P2 and P3 for readability. As we already discussed in
Section 2, the running example is secure against a MITM attack. Therefore, when SPiM reaches the
goal location (with ID = 7 in Table 4), the state is unsatisfiable and, by using the Learn rule, SPiM
produces an interpolant (annotation) and propagates it back using the Conjoin rule. The interpolant
generated in location ID 6 and reported in Figure 13-left constrains the intruder knowledge (IK) listing
which messages have to be in IK and which messages must not be in IK. We note that the interpolant in
Figure 13-left contains only constants and no variables. This is due to the implementation of IK in SPiM.
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¬IK ` {na,a}∧ [
IK ` {na,na,a}∨
IK ` {na,nb,a}∨
[IK ` {na,a}pk(a)∧ IK ` inv(pk(a))]∨
[IK ` {na,a}pk(i)∧ IK ` inv(pk(i))]∨
[IK ` {na,a}pk(b)∧ IK ` inv(pk(b))]∨
[IK ` {na}∧ IK ` a]]
¬IK ` {na,a}∧
IK ` {na,a}pk(i)∧
IK ` inv(pk(i))
Fig. 13. Two examples of interpolants constraining the intruder knowledge
In fact, IK contains only constants since we only store the actual value (constant) of each component of
a message sent to the intruder.
When we reach the end of the execution of the protocol (i.e., location with ID = 6) with the con-
straint S2_Bob.A 6= i, then the authentication property (ID = 7) cannot be reached. Therefore, it is not
possible for the intruder to craft the message S2_Bob.Nb encrypted with the public key of S2_Bob.B
without playing the role of the agent S2_Bob.A. This is due to the impossibility for the intruder to obtain
the nonces S2_Bob.Na or S2_Bob.Nb without playing the role of S2_Bob.A, i.e., without decrypting a
message containing S2_Bob.Na or S2_Bob.Nb.
The annotation (of location 6 in Table 4) in Figure 13-left9, in fact, states that it is impossible to reach
the goal location if the intruder does not know the message {na,a} and (at the same time) one of the
followings holds:
• IK ` {na,na,a}∨ IK ` {na,nb,a}. In fact, the only way for the intruder to know one of these two
messages is to play the role of a, which contradicts the goal.
• IK ` {na,a}pk(∗)∧ IK ` inv(pk(∗)), where ∗ refers to one of the two honest agents or the intruder.
In fact, if the intruder knows the inverse key to decrypt this message, he has to either play the role
of a or b. The former contradicts the first conjunct of the goal, the latter contradicts the second.
• IK ` na∧ IK ` a. This constraint (together with the initial ¬IK ` {na,a}) states that if the intruder
knows the components of {na,a} but has not been able to pair na and a, then he will not reach the
goal location.
Another similar example is reported in Figure 13-right. The annotation has been generated by the
Conjoin rule for the location between the actions with ID 4 and 5 (Table 4) and shows how the previous
annotation (Figure 13-left) simplifies during the backtrack phase.
Interpolants constraining instantiation of variables.. The second type of interpolants is the one con-
straining the instantiation of program variables. For example, the following interpolant constraints the
instantiation of the agent’s variables in such a way that a path where the intruder plays the role of Alice
will not be (re-)executed since it is (trivially) in contrast with the authentication goal:
S2_Bob.A = i
9Note that, for the sake of readability, we refer to the constants of the nonces using the notation na,nb instead of c0,c1.
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6. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other tool for security protocol analysis that uses a speed-up
technique based on Craig’s interpolation. We now discuss some further related work on interpolation, in
addition to the works we already considered in detail in the other sections of the paper.
In [15], McMillan presented the IntraLA algorithm that we have used as a basis for this work. How-
ever, our application field is network security whereas IntraLA has been developed for software verifica-
tion, and this has led to a number of substantial differences between the two works. First of all, our case
studies are security protocols, and thus parallel programs, whereas IntraLA works on sequential ones.
For this reason, we have defined a simple programming language (SiL) with some protocol-oriented
features and provided a translation procedure from protocol specifications (expressed in ASLan++) into
SiL programs (proving the correctness of the translation with respect to the semantics of ASLan++). In
particular, given the object of our study, SiL allows one to express statements aimed at handling the ac-
tions of the DY intruder. The DY theory has then been used both in the symbolic execution of a program
graph (Decide rule, Section 4) and for interpolants generation (Learn rule, Section 4). The nature of the
goals that we verify also differ from the ones in [15], as they are directly related to security goals like
authentication and confidentiality. The same differences can be found between SPiM and IMPACT II
(the implementation of [15]): IMPACT II takes as input control flow graphs from C programs and has
been tested on the source codes of drivers. The algorithm implementations do also have some differ-
ences. In particular, in SPiA, we have implemented an optimization according to which an interpolant is
calculated, at a given node or edge, only when the graph presents an unexplored path that can be blocked
by such an interpolant.
Recently, McMillan has proposed in [17] a variation of IntraLA that mainly adapts IntraLA to large-
block encoding (LBE). This technique reduces the abstract reachability tree used by the IntraLA algo-
rithm, for example by simplifying the tree produced from very long sequences of if statements. Moving
from original trees to the ones produced with LBE is not a trivial task and requires further investiga-
tion. Introducing LBE could speed up our tool too but, as we have already discussed in Section 5.1, we
implemented SPiM mainly to show that interpolation can concretely be used as a speed-up technique
together with the DY intruder model in the context of security protocols. Other works by McMillan that
exploit the use of Craig interpolation in model checking are [32, 33], but interpolants are used there in a
different way, i.e., to apply interpolant-based image approximation.
Besides McMillan’s works on interpolation applied to model checking, there are a number of model
checkers that implement different techniques to speed-up the search for goal locations. In particular, for
the purpose of the comparison with SPiM and in addition to the tools already considered in Section 5.1,
we consider here four security protocol analysis tools that implement the DY intruder theory: Maude-
NPA [34], ProVerif [4], Scyther [35] and Tamarin [36].
Besides DY, Maude-NPA supports a wide range of theories such as the “associative-commutative plus
identity” theory. Maude-NPA has been implemented with particular focus on performances and in fact,
during the analysis, it takes advantage of various state-space reduction techniques. These range from
a modified version of the lazy intruder (called “super lazy intruder”) to a partial-order reduction tech-
nique. The ideas behind the speed-up techniques of Maude-NPA are very similar to the ones of SPiM:
reduce the number of states to explore and try to not explore a state after having the evidence that
from this state the model checker will never reach the goal location (i.e., will never reach the initial
state given that Maude-NPA performs a backward reachability search). As for all the back-ends of the
AVANTSSAR Platform (discussed in Section 5.1), in principle we do not see any incompatibility in
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combining the interpolation-based technique we have proposed in this paper with the speed-up tech-
niques implemented in Maude-NPA. However, Maude-NPA performs backward reachability analysis
whereas our technique has been defined for forward reachability analysis. This does not prevent pos-
sible useful interaction between the two approaches but it might require a non-trivial adaptation of the
interpolation-based algorithm.
In ProVerif, security protocols are represented using Prolog rules in order to handle multiple execu-
tions. It implements an efficient algorithm that, combined with a unification technique along with rule
optimization procedures, handles the problem of state-space explosion. Due to the particular nature of
the techniques it implements, it is not clear if ProVerif could further improve its performance by inte-
grating an interpolation-based technique.
Scyther uses a pattern-refinement algorithm that provides concise representations of (infinite) sets
of traces. It does not use approximation methods nor abstraction techniques and it could thus benefit
from including our technique, in particular, when unbounded verification is performed. However, as
with Maude-NPA, due to Scyther’s backward searching algorithm, this integration would require further
study.
Tamarin uses a constraint-solving algorithm and a symbolic representation of states like SPiM, but
supports analysis for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Intruder capabilities and protocols are
specified jointly as a set of (labeled) multiset rewriting rules. Tamarin is particularly well suited for the
analysis of protocols that use the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which SPiM does not handle. One of
the main difficulties one might have in implementing our speed-up technique in Tamarin is thus with
the Diffie-Hellman key representation. However, since Tamarin uses a (labeled) operational semantics
that is similar to the one used in SPiM, it might still be feasible to adapt the interpolation technique
successfully.
7. Concluding remarks
We believe that our interpolation-based method, together with its prototype implementation in the
SPiM tool and our experimental evaluation, shows that we can indeed use interpolation to reduce the
search space and speed up the execution also in the case of security protocol verification. In particular,
as we have shown, we can use a standard security protocol specification language (ASLan++, but, we
believe that with little effort, also other languages that specify the different protocol roles as interacting
processes could be used) and translate automatically into SPiM’s input language SiL with the guarantee
that in doing so we will not introduce nor lose any attack. The tool then proceeds automatically and
concludes reporting either all the different reachable states (from which one or more abstract attack
traces can be extracted) or that no attack has been found for the given specification.
As future work, we plan to increment our experimental results by considering further (and more com-
plex) security protocols, such as those described in [37] and in the standard literature. This will allow us
to collect further evidence as to what extent interpolation can indeed increase the performance of SPiM.
More importantly, as we remarked above, we are not aware of any other tool for security protocol
verification that uses an interpolation-based speed-up technique, and we believe that actually interpola-
tion might be proficiently used in addition (and not in alternative) to other optimization techniques for
security protocol verification. We are thus currently investigating possible useful interactions between
interpolation and such optimization techniques, given that there are no theoretical or technical incom-
patibilities between them. This will allow us to enhance SPiM and promote its performance closer to the
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level of the more mature tools. Symmetrically, it would be interesting to investigate also whether such
mature tools might benefit from the integration of interpolation-based techniques such as ours to provide
an additional boost to their performance. This will of course be a much more challenging endeavor to
undertake, as it will possibly require some internal changes to already deployed tools, but given our
close scientific relations to some of the tool developers, we are hopeful that we will be able to carry out
some attempts in this direction.
Appendix A. ASLan++ specification of NSL.
1 specification NSL
2 channel_model CCM
3
4 entity Environment {
5 symbols
6 a,b:agent;
7
8 entity Session (A, B: agent) {
9
10 entity Alice (Actor, B: agent) {
11
12 symbols
13 Na, Nb: text;
14
15 body {
16 Na := fresh();
17 Actor -> B: {Na.Actor}_pk(B);
18 B -> Actor: {Na.?Nb.B}_pk(Actor);
19 Actor -> B: {auth:(Nb)}_pk(B));
20 }
21 }
22
23 entity Bob (A, Actor: agent) {
24
25 symbols
26 Na, Nb: text;
27
28 body {
29 ? -> Actor: {?Na.?A}_pk(Actor);
30 Nb := fresh();
31 Actor -> A: {Na.Nb.Actor}_pk(A);
32 A -> Actor: {auth:(Nb)}_pk(Actor);
33 }
34 }
35
36 body { % of Session
37 new Alice(A,B);
38 new Bob(A,B);
39 }
40
41 goals
42 auth:(_) A *-> B;
43 }
44
45 body { % of Environment
46 any Session(a,i);
47 any Session(a,b);
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48 }
49 }
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We show two representative cases; the other ones can be treated similarly. (i) Let the statement
I considered be the receipt of a message having the form:
1 entity Environment {
2 ...
3 entity Session (A, B: agent) {
4 ...
5 entity Alice(Actor, B: agent) {
6 ...
7 body {
8 ...
9 B -> Actor: M(?A_1,...?A_n)
10 ...
11 }
The corresponding ASLan rule r has the form:
1 step ...(...) :=
2 PF’.
3 iknows(M’(N_1,..., N_n)).
4 state_Alice(B_1,...,B_m)
5 =>
6 R’.
7 state_Alice(B’_1,...,B’_m)
where M′ is the ASLan translation of M, n6m and ∀ j.16 j6m if j = f (Alice,A_i) for some 16 i6 n,
then B′_ f (Alice,A_i) = N_i, otherwise B′_ j = B_ j.
For simplicity, we ignore in the variable names the prefixes referring to the session instance. w has the
form:
1 if (IK |- M’’(Y_1,...,Y_n))
2 then
3 Alice.A_1 = Y_1;
4 ...
5 Alice.A_N = Y_N;
6 else
7 end
where M′′ is the SiL translation of M where we have replaced ?A_1, ...,?A_n with Y_1, ...,Y_n.
(⇒) Let S′ be such that S r−→ S′. By the semantics of ASLan, there must exist a substitution σ such that:
iknows(M′(N_1, ...,N_n)).state_Alice(B_1, ...,B_m)σ ⊆ dSeH
Furthermore, there exists a substitution σ ′′ such that:
state_Alice(B′_1, ...,B′_m)σσ ′′ ⊆ dS′eH
Then we can build an extension ς¯ of ς such that:
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• ς¯(Y_i) = σ(N_i) for 16 i6 n;
• ς¯(A) = σ(A) for any other variable A.
It follows that M′(N_1, ...,N_n)σ ∼ M′′(Y_1, ...,Y_n)ς¯ and since iknows(M′(N_1, ...,N_n))σ ⊆ dSeH
then, by hypothesis, M′′(Y_1, ...,Y_n) ∈DY (ς¯(IK)) which implies < IK `M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n), ς¯ >⇓ true.
By using this fact in the following derivation:
< IK `M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n), ς¯ >⇓ true
< Y _1, ς¯ >⇓ ς¯(Y )
<Φ1, ς¯ >⇓ ς1
....
< Alice.A_2 := Y _2,ς1 >⇓ ς2
<Φ2, ς¯ >⇓ ς2 . . .....
<Φn−1, ς¯ >⇓ Σn−1
< Yn,ςn−1 >⇓ ς¯(Yn)
<Ψn,ςn−1 >⇓ ςn ≡ ς ′
<Φn, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′
< i f (IK `M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n)) then Φn else end, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′
we get that < w, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′ ≡ ςn, where we have used the abbreviations:
Φi ≡ Alice.A_1 := Y _1; . . . ; Alice.A_i := Y _i;
Ψi ≡ Alice.A_1 := Y _i; . . . ; Alice.A_i := Y _n;
ςi ≡ ς¯ [Alice.A_1← ς¯(Y _1), ..., Alice.A_i← ς¯(Y _i)].
We have that S′(Alice, f (Alice,A_i)) = σ(B′_ f (Alice,A_i)) = σ(N_i) = ς ′(Alice.A_i), for 1 6 i 6 n.
Since S′ and ς ′ coincide with S and ς , respectively, for what concerns the other variables, we can con-
clude S′ ∼ ς ′.
(⇐) Assume there exists an extension ς¯ of ς such that < w, ς¯ >⇓ ς ′. The case when < IK `
M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n), ς¯ >⇓ false is trivial, since ς ′ ≡ ς¯ and we can easily take S′ ≡ S. Let < IK `
M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n), ς¯ >⇓ true. Then M′′(Y _1, ...,Y _n)ς¯ ∈ DY (ς(IK)). It follows that we can choose a
substitution σ such that σ(N_i) = ς¯(Y _i), for 1 6 i 6 n, and thus iknows(M′(N_1, ...,N_n))σ ⊆ dSeH .
By applying the rules of SiL semantics as above and the rule r, we get an S′ such that S r−→ S′ and S′ ∼ ς ′.
(ii) Let us assume that Alice wants to authenticate Bob and consider, without loss of generality, a
program instance pi where pi(Alice) = a and pi(Bob) = i, since if Bob is played by an honest agent, then
the authentication property is trivially satisfied. I has the form:
1 entity Environment {
2 ...
3 entity Session (A, B: agent) {
4 ...
5 entity Alice(Actor, B: agent) {
6 ...
7 body {
8 ...
9 B -> Actor: auth:(M);
10 ...
11 }
12 ...
13 }
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14 ...
15 goals
16 auth:(_) B *-> A;
17 ....
18 }
and is a particular case of a receipt. As such, it is translated as a common receipt, treated in case (i),
plus special constructs/rules aimed at handling the goal conditions, which will be treated here. The
corresponding ASLan attack state is described by:
1 attack_state auth(M’, Actor, B,..) :=
2 not(dishonest(B)).
3 not(witness(B, Actor, M’, auth)).
4 request(Actor, B, M’, auth, ...)
where M′ is the ASLan translation of M (for simplicity, we assume here that the payload on which
authentication is based is the whole message). We also add a corresponding ASLan rule r of the form:
1 AS => AS.attack
which simply adds the 0-ary predicate attack to an attack state AS containing the predicates described
above.
The corresponding SiL statement w has the form:
1 if(not(Alice.B = i) and not(witness(Alice.B, Alice.Actor, M’’)))
2 then
3 attack := true;
4 else
5 skip;
where M′′ is the SiL translation of M. First, we notice that while the rule r can be applied at any step in
an ASLan run, the corresponding SiL statement w is placed, by the translation procedure, immediately
after the receipt instruction. For simplicity, we will restrict to consider those ASLan runs where attack
rules concerning authentication goals, like r above, are only applied immediately after the receipt of the
corresponding message. This can be done without loss of generality (and is also the reason why we do
not need a request predicate in SiL).
(⇒) In order to apply the rule r, by the semantics of ASLan, there must exist a substitution σ such that:
request(Actor,B,M′,auth, . . .).state_Alice(...,B, ...)σ ⊆ dSeH
where, in particular, σ(B) = S(Alice, f (Alice,B)). At the same time, we have: dishonest(B)σ 6⊆ dSeH
and witness(B,Actor,M′,auth)σ 6⊆ dSeH .
Since, as for every ASLan state, dishonest(i) ⊆ dSeH , we get σ(B) 6= i. Let ς¯ be an extension of ς .
By hypothesis, S∼ ς , from which we infer σ(B) = S(Alice, f (Alice,B)) = ς(Alice.B) = ς¯(Alice.B) 6= i.
With analogous arguments, we infer (ς¯(Alice.B), ς¯(Alice.Actor), ς¯(M′′)) /∈ ς¯(witness). By using these
facts, we obtain the derivation in Figure 14.
We have that S′ and ς ′ differ from S and ς¯ , respectively, only for the value of the predicate attack. By
observing that attack ⊆ dS′eH and ς ′(attack) = true, we conclude S′ ∼ ς ′.
(⇐) Let ς¯ be an extension of ς such that < w,ς >⇓ ς ′. The case when < Ψ, ς¯ >⇓ f alse, where Ψ is
defined as in (⇒) above, is trivial. Let us consider < Ψ, ς¯ >⇓ true. By hypothesis, S ∼ ς and thus the
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preconditions of r concerning the predicates dishonest and witness are enabled in S. As for the condition
on the request, it is enabled by the fact that the corresponding receipt has just been encountered, by
construction of a SiL graph. It follows that r can be applied and we get an ASLan state S′, which differs
from S only in the fact that attack ⊆ dS′eH . Moreover, by applying the same derivation as in case (⇒)
above, we have ς ′(attack) = true, from which we conclude S′ ∼ ς ′. 
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